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The Fourth Amendment and 
Technological Exceptionalism After 
Carpenter: A Case Study on Hash-Value 
Matching 
Denae Kassotis* 
The Fourth Amendment has long served as a barrier between 
the police and the people; ensuring the government acts 
reasonably in combating crime. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
is more dynamic than other constitutional guarantees, and has 
undergone periodic shifts to account for technological and cultural 
changes. The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in United States v. 
Carpenter marks the most recent jurisprudential shift, as the Court 
departed from the well-settled reasonable expectation of privacy 
test to account for a new technology (CSLI records). This Note 
examines Carpenter’s impact on future Fourth Amendment cases, 
using another novel surveillance technique, hash-value matching, 
as a case study. Hash-value matching is a binary authentication 
method that can scan billions of digital communications in seconds 
for evidence of contraband. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever wondered how your email account verifies that 
you have entered the correct password when you attempt to log-in? 
Websites that require a user to log-in with a password keep a 
repository of hash-values corresponding to passwords that unlock 
specific user’s accounts.1 When a user first creates their password, 
the alphanumeric string they enter is run through a hash algorithm, 
converting it into a shortened output with a fixed length.2 This 
output, known as the password’s hash-value, is then saved by the 
website.3 When a user later attempts to log-in with the same input, 
the input will again be run through the hash-algorithm to create a 
hash-value.4 If the hash-value for the attempted log-in matches the 
stored hash-value, corresponding to the password initially entered, 
the user will be allowed to proceed into the account.5 Moreover, 
since websites store password’s hash-values, which cannot be 
converted back to the passwords they correspond to, even if their 
repository of hashes was hacked, a hacker would not be able to 
retrieve the desired passwords.6 
The process used to verify passwords is called data-exposure.7 
Data-exposure refers to a model where an entity keeps a repository 
of hash-values corresponding to known inputs (such as correct 
passwords), and compares unknown inputs (such as attempted 
passwords) against the repository to “expose” a match.8 If an 
unknown input matches a known hash-value, it is certain that the 
 
1 Understanding Password Authentication & Password Cracking, 
WORDFENCE, https://www.wordfence.com/learn/how-passwords-work-and-
cracking-passwords/ [https://perma.cc/9GUQ-EV9E] (last updated June 25, 
2018). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. 
7 Cf. Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the 
Hash, 119 HARV. L. REV. 38, 43 (2005) (defining data exposure as matching an 
unknown set of hash-values against a known hash list to reveal particular files.); 
see also infra Introduction.  
8 Id. 
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unknown input is the same as the input that created the known 
hash-value.9 
Safe password storage is one of many innocuous uses of data 
exposure. For example, law enforcement can compare a suspect’s 
hard-drive against a customized hash-list to look for files stolen 
during an intrusion, or for pirated software not yet released to the 
public.10 These examples refer to a targeted government search of 
lawfully acquired private property for digital contraband. But, law 
enforcement is not the only entity with access to hashing software. 
In fact, conglomerates like Microsoft hash every file sent through 
their network for evidence of child pornography.11 Social giants 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft, and YouTube hash user 
content to thwart the distribution of terrorist content and curtail 
protest activity.12 ISPs like AT&T have discussed hashing user 
data to identify copyright infringing music or movies shared 
among friends.13 Moreover, private companies are encouraged, 
both by law and social norms, to turn over evidence of hash-
matches to law enforcement. Although it is in society’s best 
interest for law enforcement to receive much of this evidence, 
where is the line drawn? Furthermore, is the Fourth Amendment 
triggered when private actors systematically share evidence with 
the government? 
 
9 Id. at 40. 
10 Id. at 43. 
11 See United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *3 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2017). 
12 Kalev Leetaru, Can We Finally Stop Terrorists from Exploiting Social 
Media?, FORBES (Oct. 9, 2018, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/10/09/can-we-finally-stop-
terrorists-from-exploiting-social-media/#7ce5faae6d80 [https://perma.cc/8SNY-
R9WL]; Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube Provide Update on Global 
Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, MICROSOFT CORP. BLOGS (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/04/facebook-microsoft-
twitter-and-youtube-provide-update-on-global-internet-forum-to-counter-
terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/A6BS-24XM]. 
13 See Brad Stone, AT&T and Other I.S.P.’s May Be Getting Ready to Filter, 
N.Y. TIMES: BITS BLOG (Jan. 8, 2008, 7:07 PM), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/att-and-other-isps-may-be-getting-
ready-to-filter/ [https://perma.cc/E676-Q6D2]; see, e.g., In re United States of 
America’s Application for a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Elec. Devices 
from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
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This Note proceeds in three Parts. It assesses the impact of 
United States v. Carpenter on Fourth Amendment rights by 
exploring the admissibility of hash-match evidence of child 
pornographic images, that are intercepted by a private actor and 
shared with the government via statutory mandate. Part I of this 
Note introduces hash-value matching technology and explores the 
effect of hashing, as well as other information age technologies, on 
information privacy. Next, Part I discusses the regulatory short-
comings of the federal law’s ability to govern information privacy. 
Finally, it analyzes the private and binary search doctrines and 
discusses the state of Fourth Amendment doctrine before and after 
Carpenter. 
Part II further unpacks the Carpenter decision and its impact 
on a Court reviewing an “exceptional” technology under the 
Fourth Amendment. Part II also proposes a new framework to 
determine if a technology is exceptional, meaning that technology 
should not be analogized to previous technologies of its kind. In 
determining technological exceptionalism, this Note proposes an 
inquiry into whether a technology is fundamentally different from 
others of its kind, and whether the technology is “much less costly” 
for the government to employ. Moreover, this Note proposes that if 
a technology meets the definition of “exceptional,” it causes a 
rights-shift. A rights-shift occurs when the low cost of a new 
surveillance method allows the government to engage in a 
surveillance activity it was once precluded from. A rights-shift 
disrupts the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between law 
enforcement and citizens. This Note proposes that in response to 
an unbalanced Fourth Amendment, courts should follow Justice 
Robert’s approach in Riley and Carpenter and holistically assess 
the technology at issue. Further, in the rare circumstance that a 
technology is deemed exceptional, courts should look at the totality 
of the circumstances in assessing the diminution in privacy caused 
by the technology, and avoid rigidly applying the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. Finally, Part III assesses the Fourth 
Amendment implications of hash-value matching pursuant to the 
framework proposed in Part II. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF HASH-VALUE MATCHING, INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE, AND INFORMATION PRIVACY 
A. Hash-Value Matching 
Hashing is a common forensic technique used to analyze 
digital images taken from a computer.14 It is “the process of taking 
an input data string from an electronic [file] and using a 
mathematical function to generate a (usually smaller) output 
string.”15 The output string, called the hash-value,16 is a “digital 
fingerprint” shared by any duplicate of the input data string.17 Any 
two iterations of the same file will, with over ninety-nine percent 
accuracy, produce the same hash-value.18 Thus, hash-values are 
uniquely associated with the input data, such that, “if an unknown 
file has a hash-value identical to that of another known file, then [it 
is clear] that the first file is the same as the second.”19 One of the 
advantages of hashing software is the ability to scan a large 
number of electronic files for their hash-values in very little time, 
and, do so without exposing the underlying image corresponding to 
the hash to third-party viewers.20 
The cryptographic, or “one-way,” hash algorithm, referred to in 
this Note, is impossible to reverse—that is, to turn the hash-value 
 
14 See United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017). 
15 Id. (citing Salgado, supra note 8, at 38–39). 
16 The terms “hash” and “hash-value” are interchangeable and will be used 
interchangeably throughout this paper. Forensic Use of Hash Values and 
Associated Hash Algorithms, NETH. FORENSIC INST. 2 (Jan. 2018), 
https://www.forensischinstituut.nl/binaries/nfi/documenten/publicaties/2018/02/
13/vakbijlage-forensisch-gebruik-van-bestandskenmerken-en-bijbehorende-
hashalgoritmen/Supplement-hashes-v2018_01a_English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2M6F-T33E]. 
17 Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1. With respect to images and videos, 
hashing software breaks them down into bits of data, and assigns that data 
alphanumeric values based on the image’s hue gradient. The resulting string of 
numbers is the image’s hash-value. Since a hash-value is derived from each 
“bit” of data, and its placement relative to other bits, it is intimately associated 
with the image. See NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16, at 2. 
18 United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *1 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017). 
19 Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1. 
20 Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2. 
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back into the underlying image it identifies.21 Moreover, it is 
practically impossible22 to find two files that have different content 
but the same hash value.23 
1. Detecting Child Pornography 
Hashing has an array of forensic purposes, including the 
identification, verification, and authentication of data.24 One such 
purpose, known as “data exposure” or hash-value matching,25 is 
the process of matching a hash-set26 associated with an 
individual’s files against a known hash set to reveal particular 
files.27 Hash-value matching can accurately and expeditiously 
identify whether a computer contains known digital contraband.28 
This Note specifically addresses the use of hash-value matching to 
determine whether a suspect’s computer contains child 
pornographic images, and the subsequent use of such hash 
evidence at a criminal trial. 
The advent of the internet provided a new means for trafficking 
child pornography.29 In response to the ever-increasing use of 
internet communication, Congress created a statutory scheme to 
identify digital files containing child pornography, which conferred 
 
21 NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16, at 3. 
22 In this context, “practically impossible” can be read as “even when all the 
computing power of the world could be used simultaneously, it is still 
impossible.” Id. at 3 n.4. 
23 Id. at 3. 
24 See generally Salgado, supra note 8, at 43. 
25 Hash-value matching is the process of matching a media hash set against a 
known hash set to reveal particular files. This process is also known as data 
exposure. Id. For purposes of this Note, which focuses on the use of hash-
values, the aforementioned process is generally referred to as “hashing.” See id. 
26 In this context, a “hash-set” refers colloquially to the list of hash-values 
associated with an individual’s files. See NETH. FORENSIC INST., supra note 16, 
at 2. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 Alexandra L. Mitter, Deputizing Internet Service Providers: How the 
Government Avoids Fourth Amendment Protections, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 235, 241 (2011) (“Before the advent of the Internet, production and 
reproduction of pornographic images involving children were extremely difficult 
and expensive, and the sale and distribution of those images were similarly risky 
endeavors.”). 
2019] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & HASH-VALUE MATCHING 1251 
 
broad investigative powers on federal and local government.30 
Congress’s response was swift and effective, in part because its 
legislation capitalized on the unique position of electronic 
communication service providers (“ECSPs”), specifically, Internet 
Service Providers (“ISPs”).31 Although this scheme has been 
efficient in reducing the spread of child pornography, it implicates 
Fourth Amendment and information privacy concerns for every 
individual who communicates digitally.32 The following Section 
discusses hashing’s central role in the statutory framework 
curtailing the spread of digital contraband.33 
2. The Reporting Dynamic Between ECSPs and Law 
Enforcement 
Pursuant to the Crime Prevention Act of 1990, “[a] person 
who, while engaged in a professional capacity . . . learns of facts 
that give reason to suspect that a child has suffered an incident of 
child abuse . . . and fails to make a timely report” can face a fine or 
imprisonment.34 Further, the PROTECT (“Providing Resources, 
Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats”) Our 
Children Act provides that any electronic communication service 
(“ECS”)35 or remote computing service (“RCS”) provider that 
 
30 See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a) (2012). 
31 See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 5 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1417 (2009); infra Part I.A.3.  
32 See infra Part III. Per a 2018 study, there will be over 3.8 billion email users 
before the start of 2019. That is over half of the world’s population. Heinz 
Tschabitscher, How Many Email Users are There?, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-email-users-are-there-1171213 
[https://perma.cc/SF3K-NZE3] (last updated Dec. 16, 2018). 
33 See, e.g., Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 
[CPOEA], Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2251 (2006)); Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 18 and 42 
U.S.C.); PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 676–86 
(codified in scattered sections of Title 18 U.S.C.) (“Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today”). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 229 F. Supp. 
3d 1230, 1233 (D. Kan. 2017).  
35 “‘[E]lectronic communication service’ means any service which provides to 
users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012). 
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obtains actual knowledge of an image depicting child pornography 
is required to provide a report to the National Center for Missing 
and Exploited Children’s (“NCMEC”) CyberTipline36 “as soon as 
reasonably possible.”37 
Moreover, “[m]any [ECS] providers, desiring to avoid any 
reputation for aiding those who possess or transmit child 
pornography, use [hashing software] to scan files that customers 
upload through the service providers’ browsers, applications, or 
cloud storage facilities.”38 Major ECSPs, such as Microsoft, 
compare hash-values generated from user content that correspond 
to confirmed images of child pornography.39 Hash-values saved in 
the NCMEC repository or similar database are compared with the 
hash-values of files transmitted or stored on an ECSP’s server by 
its automated hashing software.40 Pursuant to the PROTECT Act, 
if a provider gets a match, the provider must refer the files, along 
with the sender’s subscriber information, to NCMEC.41 NCMEC 
operates a database that serves as the central repository of hash-
vales for confirmed images depicting child pornography.42 
 
36 NCMEC launched its CyberTipline in 1998 to help battle the sexual 
exploitation of children by providing the public and ECS providers with the 
ability to report online instances of exploitation. CyberTipline, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., www.missingkids.com/gethelpnow/cybertipline 
[https://perma.cc/4P3P-VZDW] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(1) (2012). 
38 United States v. Reddick, No. 2:16-CR-928, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 13, 2017). “Google, has been using its proprietary hashing technology 
since 2008 to identify ‘confirmed child sexual abuse images.’ After an image of 
child sexual abuse is viewed ‘by at least one Google employee,’ the image ‘is 
given a digital fingerprint (hash)’ and is added to Google’s repository of hashes 
of apparent child pornography as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256.” United States v. 
Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 
2017). “AOL’s automated filter works by identifying the hash values of images 
attached to emails sent through its mail servers. Those values are then compared 
to the hash values of images that AOL employees have viewed previously and 
deemed child pornography. Any email containing an image with a matching 
hash value is automatically weeded out.” United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 
1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 2016). 
39 Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803 at *2. 
40 Id.  
41 See id. at *3; 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A). 
42 Reddick, 2017 WL 1353803, at *2. 
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After an ECSP submits a report to the CyberTipline, NCMEC, 
viewing the hash-value only, generates its own report.43 NCMEC 
then conducts an initial investigation, limited to confirming the 
hash-value match and identifying the location of the internet user 
whose equipment uploaded the matching file.44 Finally, NCMEC 
forwards the report to the law enforcement agency with 
jurisdiction over the internet user.45 Further, the internal policies of 
most ECSP’s regarding the use of proprietary hashing software 
contemplate that a human employee will confirm that the image 
depicts child pornography before a report is submitted to 
NCMEC.46 
Litigation arising from this dynamic principally consists of 
criminal defendants arguing that this scheme violates their Fourth 
Amendment rights.47 However, at least before Carpenter, the 
intermediary role of ECSPs, results in the dismissal of almost all 
Fourth Amendment challenges. The following Subsection 
discusses issues concerning ISPs as information intermediaries. 
 
43 See id. at *3.  
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content, 
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 5, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com
/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/ 
[https://perma.cc/KA8E-6J6U] (describing Facebook’s use of hashing software 
to remove violent terrorist imagery and its policy to review material that 
matches a hash-value known to depict terrorist content before automatically 
removing the material); supra note 38 and accompanying text. For example, 
Google maintains a repository of apparent child pornography, as defined by 18 
U.S.C. § 2256, which consists of images that have been determined to depict 
child pornography by “at least one Google employee.” When Google encounters 
a hash that matches a hash of a known child sexual abuse image, it undertakes a 
manual human review to confirm the image contains child pornography. The 
typical process looks like Google’s proprietary hashing software. See United 
States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 
23, 2017). 
47 See e.g., Miller, 2017 WL 2705963. 
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3. The Crucial Role of an ISP in Obtaining Hash Evidence 
An ISP,48 subject to the reporting requirements of the 
PROTECT Our Children Act,49 has a unique and crucial role in 
routing its user’s communications to the rest of the world.50 An ISP 
owns the point on the network between a user’s computer and the 
rest of the internet—the only point through which all the user’s 
communications must pass.51 This chokepoint allows ISPs to 
engage in large scale surveillance of its users, accessing more 
information than any other type of electronic service provider—
even Google.52 Since ISPs are the “gateway,” or first-step, to the 
 
48 An internet service provider is a “company that provides internet 
connections and services to individuals and organizations. In addition to 
providing access to the Internet, ISPs may also provide software packages (such 
as browsers), e-mail accounts, and a personal Web site or home page.” Internet 
Service Provider, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/technology/Internet-service-provider [https://perma.cc/LQ26-5AA6] (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2019).  
49 ISPs meet the statutory definition of an ECSP under the PROTECT Our 
Children Act. 18 U.S.C. §2258(a) (2012) (defining “reporting requirements of 
providers.”)  Courts have struggled to correctly classify different electronic 
communications providers. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 
360 (4th Cir. 2010) (labeling AOL an internet service provider). However, the 
text and spirit of the PROTECT Act and judicial precedent indicate that ISPs are 
the exact entity Congress intended to subject to reporting requirements. In 
general, due to network design, a user’s communication must pass through a 
“privileged network bottleneck” controlled by his ISP to reach other internet 
users or sites. Put differently, “a user cannot say anything to Google without 
saying it first to his ISP, and an ISP can [] hear everything a user says to other 
websites like Facebook.” Ohm, supra note 31, at 1420. Thus, ISPs have greater 
access to electronically transmitted communications than any other electronic 
service provider—even Google. See id. Ohm defines an ISP as a 
“telecommunications compan[y] that route[s] communications to and from 
Internet-connected computers.” Id. at 1420 n.1. This definition of ISP falls 
squarely within the statutory definition of an ECS, i.e., “any service which 
provides to users thereof the ability to send and receive wire or electronic 
communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012). 
50 Ohm, supra note 31, at 1423. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1420. “Likewise, the ISP can scrutinize communications sent to 
almost all of Google’s other services. Every time a user adds an appointment to 
his Google Calendar, sends or receives an e-mail message through Gmail, reads 
blogs using Google Reader, edits a word processing document in Google Docs, 
or views a video in Google-owned YouTube, his computer sends copies of his 
messages, requests, and behavior first through his ISP.” Id. at 1440. 
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Internet, “almost any communication sent to anybody online” is 
accessible first by an ISP.53 Further, by imposing reporting 
obligations on ISPs and immunizing them from suit, Congress both 
recognized and ratified their unique enforcement role.54 
In the early days of the internet, ISPs conducted broad 
automated monitoring of their user’s communications for business 
purposes, such as gauging the health of the network, detecting 
spam, and policing bandwidth.55 Such automated monitoring was 
relatively non-invasive, since ISPs preserved privacy by “keeping 
a shallow, limited view” of user’s communications.56 
However, sparse legal constraints on ISPs, incentive to 
monetize user data, and technological advances led to a shift in ISP 
monitoring behavior in the 2000s.57 The combination of these 
factors gave ISPs the motive and the means to deeply scrutinize 
their user’s communications.58 First, after Google demonstrated the 
efficacy of monetizing user behavior by displaying advertisements 
targeted to user’s search queries, ISPs followed suit.59 Next, before 
the early 2000s, network monitoring was constrained by the 
relative slowness of computers and technological limitations on 
 
53 Id. at 1438. “ISPs can view [user activity] across the Internet landscape, 
seeing everything we do regardless of destination or application.” Additionally, 
an ISP can view its user’s activities deeply, “because packet sniffers can store 
everything.” Id. 
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 2258(A)–2258(B) (2012). An ECSP who obtains actual 
knowledge of child abuse must report it to NCMEC. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A). No 
civil claim or criminal charge may be brought against an ECSP arising from its 
reporting responsibilities in any Federal or State court. 18 U.S.C. § 2258(B). 
55 Ohm, supra note 31, at 1424. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 1425, 1427, 1432. Google, by displaying advertisements matching 
user’s recent search inquiries, was the first ECSP to successfully monetize user’s 
browsing behavior. Other ECSPs have attempted to follow suit and capitalize on 
user’s behavioral data, a phenomenon known as “Google envy.” Id. at 1426. 
58 Id. at 1432. 
59 Id. at 1426. Arguably, ISPs were forced to find an additional source of 
revenue in response to novel internet applications that required large amounts of 
bandwidth and burdened existing network infrastructure. ISPs had to invest 
significant capital in their infrastructure to support increased bandwidth, but 
customers were unwilling to pay astronomical monthly fees to fund the increase. 
Id. at 1425–26. 
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monitoring hardware.60 Put differently, ISPs lacked the computing 
horsepower to swiftly capture and analyze communications sent 
across their networks.61 Professor Ohm62 analogizes the limitation 
on pre-2000 network monitoring to a single police officer 
monitoring traffic on the side of a country road.63 How thoroughly 
the officer can scan the passing cars depends on two metrics: how 
many cars drive by in a fixed time-period, and how quickly the 
officer can scan each car.64 The first metric, the volume of traffic, 
is akin to how many communications pass through a network 
(bandwidth).65 The second, the officer’s efficiency, represents the 
relative capabilities of network monitoring tools.66 
Post-2000, the horsepower of internet monitoring software (the 
officer’s efficiency) increased at a quicker rate than the network’s 
bandwidth (the volume of traffic).67 Thus, a former technological 
constraint on an ISP’s ability to monitor—the relative slowness of 
monitoring software—is no longer in play.68 In contrast to the 
single police officer alongside a country road, the post-2000 
metaphor would involve several police officers, trained to work at 
optimal efficiency, monitoring traffic with the help of radar guns.69 
Moreover, although the country road is replaced by a busy 
highway, the relative increase in the officers’ capabilities is greater 
than the increase in traffic.70 
 
60 Id. at 1427. Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard professor focusing on internet 
governance and constitutional law, identified four regulators of online conduct 
as: markets, norms, law, and technology. Id. 
61 Id. at 1428. 
62 Paul Ohm is the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at Georgetown Law. 
He specializes in information privacy, computer crime law, intellectual property, 
and criminal procedure. Paul Ohm, GEO. LAW, https://www.law.georgetown.edu
/faculty/paul-ohm/ [https://perma.cc/56E9-WT88] (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). 
63 Ohm, supra note 31, at 1428. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 1430. 
67 Cf. id. at 1430–31. 
68 Cf. id. 
69 See id. at 1428–31. 
70 Id. at 1427–28. 
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Finally, lawmakers swiftly recognized the unique and 
important role of ISPs in combating crime.71 Thus, following 
pressure from law enforcement agencies, Congress vested ISPs 
with certain responsibilities and immunities to assist law 
enforcement.72 Relatedly, there are sparse federal protections over 
private information held by ISPs and other third-parties.73 The 
resulting framework grants ISP’s the broad ability to monitor 
network traffic and gather user information. Moreover, it affords 
law enforcement easy access to the stored consumer-data.74 
4. Federal Framework Regulating Information Privacy 
The United States lacks a comprehensive data security law 
regulating the collection and use of personal data on the federal 
level.75 Instead, states and independent agencies are tasked with 
regulating the collection and use of personal data.76 The result is a 
non-standardized, “patchwork” system of incongruent laws that 
cannot efficiently regulate consumer privacy.77 
Moreover, there is no federal law governing mass collection of 
private information.78 The modest federal protections on consumer 
data come from the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which 
has overseen privacy regulations since the 1970s.79 Pursuant to 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”), the 
FTC is authorized to “prohibit[] unfair or deceptive acts in the 
 
71 Id. at 1426–27. 
72 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2258(A) (2012). 
73 See generally Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, 
THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://content.next.westlaw.com
/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/FullText.html?context
Data=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1 
[https://perma.cc/F66C-ZF7J]. 
74 See generally id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 See generally id. 
78 Id.  
79 Cheryl Wang, Information Privacy and Data Security Laws: An Ineffective 
Regulatory Framework, COLUM. UNDERGRADUATE L. REV. (Oct. 31, 2017), 
http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/culr/2017/10/31/information-privacy-and-data-
security-laws-an-inefficient-regulatory-framework/#_ftn3 
[https://perma.cc/F2HC-6KYZ]. 
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marketplace”—which allows it modest regulatory power over data 
collection practices.80 However, the FTC’s enforcement authority 
is limited, exemplified by its high profile action involving 
Levnovo, one of the world’s largest personal computer (“PC”) 
manufacturers, and Superfish, a browser-based advertising 
company, in 2017.81 
Between 2014 and 2015, Lenovo pre-installed Superfish’s ad-
injecting software (called “Visual Discovery”) on all its 
computers.82 This “man-in-the-middle” technique allowed 
Superfish access to user’s sensitive data—including social security 
numbers, financial account information, login information, and 
emails—by establishing Visual Discovery as a local proxy between 
a user’s PC and the websites they visited.83 Lenovo and Superfish 
made profited off of this scheme.84 In response, the FTC charged 
Lenovo with deceptively failing to “disclose adequately, that 
VisualDiscovery would act as a man-in-the-middle” and for 
unfairly preinstalling the software without notice to consumers.85 It 
thus follows that, if another company disclosed its “man-in-the-
middle” software to consumers, such an action would likely be 
outside the regulatory authority of the FTC.86 Moreover, 
exemplified by the FTC’s “roundabout” way of holding Lenovo 
liable, it can only regulate to prohibit market inequities—it cannot 
regulate the mass collection of data in the first instance.87 The 
FTC’s limited authority is the major federal regulation concerning 
data privacy; leaving most mass data collection completely 
unchecked.88 
 
80 Privacy and Data Security Update (2016), FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 
2017), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016#how 
[https://perma.cc/Z6X4-DHDT]. 
81 See Wang, supra note 79. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id. 
87 See generally id. 
88 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (authorizing the FTC to declare unlawful 
“unfair” or “deceptive” acts affecting interstate commerce.); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, FTC Releases 2018 Privacy and Data Security Update, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/03/ftc-releases-2018-
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Additionally, in early 2017, the Trump administration signed a 
Congressional resolution repealing an Obama-FCC rule that would 
have required ISPs obtain explicit consumer permission before 
sharing or selling sensitive information.89 The resolution allows 
ISPs, which are treated differently than other communication 
providers, to collect, store, share, and sell certain types of data, 
including location information, browsing history, and app-usage 
data, without a user’s consent.90 Thus, ISPs can, and do, store 
massive amounts of user information for a variety of business 
purposes, with essentially no legal hurdles.91 
In addition to sparse regulation concerning monitoring and 
storing consumer data, federal law does not effectively prevent the 
disclosure of stored information. The primary statute regulating 
disclosure of electronically stored information is the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”).92 The SCA was enacted in 1986, in 
response to the judicially crafted third-party doctrine,93 in an 
attempt to protect individuals’ private communications held in 
electronic storage by ECSPs.94 Congress tailored the SCA to 
electronic communications sent via and stored by third-parties by 
establishing that “a person or entity providing an electronic 
communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge 
to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in 
 
privacy-data-security-update [https://perma.cc/X39X-THSD] (Mar. 15, 2019) 
(“[t]he Federal Trade Commission [is] the nation’s primary privacy and data 
security enforcer.”)  
89 Kaveh Waddell, Encryption Won’t Stop Your Internet Provider from Spying 
on You, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2017/03/encryption-wont-stop-your-internet-provider-from-
spying-on-you/521208/ [https://perma.cc/93CK-TYS2]. 
90 Chris Ciaccia, How Will ISPs Collect and Sell Your Browser History, FOX 
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/tech/how-will-isps-collect-
and-sell-your-browser-history [https://perma.cc/TVS9-UP9C]. 
91 See id. 
92 See generally Michael E. Lackey & Oral D. Pottinger, Stored 
Communications Act: Practical Considerations, LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. (June 
22, 2018), https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-
journal/b/lpa/archive/2018/06/22/stored-communications-act-practical-
considerations.aspx [https://perma.cc/7L48-JX8F]. 
93 See infra Part I.C.1; see Lackey & Pottinger, supra note 92. 
94 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703–06 (2012). 
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electronic storage by that service.”95 Despite its modest 
protections, the SCA allows the government to compel an ECSP to 
disclose “a record or other information pertaining to a  . . .  
customer” by court order.96 Such an order (a “§ 2703(d) Order”) 
allows law enforcement to circumvent the warrant requirement and 
access user data without facing traditional constitutional hurdles.97 
Moreover, the SCA does not provide a suppression remedy.98 
Thus, even if law enforcement garners evidence in violation of the 
SCA, the information at issue will still see its day in court.99 The 
ease with which law enforcement can obtain a § 2703(d) Order 
illuminates a “loophole” around constitutional safeguards that the 
government capitalizes on when a target’s data is stored by a third-
party.100 
 
95 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (2012). The SCA carves out several exceptions to 
this general rule—one of which, created by the 2008 PROTECT Our Children 
Act, allows disclosure “to the [NCMEC], in connection with a report submitted 
thereto under [§] 2258A.” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(6). 
96 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)–(d). Under the SCA, only a non-content 
communication can be obtained via a § 2703(d) order. Since Carpenter does not 
acknowledge the “content/non-content” distinction emphasized by the SCA, 
discussed infra, this Note does not dive deeply into the distinction. See 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (reasoning that if email 
content received Fourth Amendment protection, the constitutional safeguard 
should also apply to CSLI data (meta-data)). The Carpenter Court also 
compared the privacy interest in CSLI, non-content data, to a privacy interest in 
physical letters held by a mail carrier and emails held by an ISP. Id. at 2230 
(citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (letters held by mail carrier); 
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 28388 (6th Cir. 2010) (e-mails held 
by Internet service provider)). 
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
98 See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a 
Suppression Remedy Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
805, 820 (2003). 
99 Id. 
100 Orin S. Kerr, Does Carpenter Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas?, 
LAWFARE (June 26, 2018, 6:44 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-
carpenter-revolutionize-law-subpoenas [https://perma.cc/7CAY-XGXQ]. 
Criminal procedure allows for two types of compulsory process: a warrant or a 
subpoena. The first path, a warrant, allows officers to physically enter a 
particularly described location and take any evidence they find, subject to the 
warrant’s terms. Search warrants are regulated by the Fourth Amendment, which 
provides several constitutional safeguards on what can be searched; the most 
notable being the probable cause and reasonableness requirements. 
Alternatively, law enforcement can gather evidence through an administrative 
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Further, ECSPs, unlike government actors, are not subject to 
constitutional constraints.101 Therefore, when evidence of criminal 
activity is obtained by an ECSP and turned over to law 
enforcement, the methods used to obtain that evidence are not 
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.102 Additionally, if a 
government search is preceded by a private search, such as one by 
an ECSP, the search will not trigger constitutional protections.103 
The unique ability of a private entity to access sensitive 
consumer information, combined with the dynamic between law 
enforcement and ECSPs, has hindered the Fourth Amendment’s 
ability to protect privately held user information. This Note 
proposes a new Fourth Amendment framework for circumstances 
where law enforcement uses novel technologies to capitalize on 
private electronic information. The following Section discusses the 
Fourth Amendment and current framework for protecting such 
information. 
B. The Fourth Amendment’s Role in Protecting Information 
Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment is our constitutional guarantee to be 
free from arbitrary government intrusion.104 But, in the context of 
hashing, an ECSP’s role as an intermediary between an individual 
and law enforcement renders most hash-evidence turned over to 
the government presumptively lawful under the private search 
 
subpoena—which has similar requirements to a § 2703(d) Order. Unlike a 
warrant, a subpoena recipient is tasked with personally gathering the requested 
evidence. Since compliance with a subpoena implies certain statements—that 
the requested records exist, you possess the records, and you believe they are 
authentic—a recipient can claim his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in response to the subpoena. Although the Fourth Amendment 
applies to a subpoena recipient, the protection is modest, and only allows the 
recipient to challenge the subpoena for being overbroad or unduly burdensome.  
101 United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *2 
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals from 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the government, not private entities.”).  
102 Id. “The Fourth Amendment ‘is wholly inapplicable’ to searches and 
seizures by ‘a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government.’” Id. 
103 See infra Part I.C.2. 
104 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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doctrine.105 Additionally, courts have held that surveillance 
techniques that reveal information in the binary (such as hashing) 
do not infringe an objective expectation of privacy when law 
enforcement detects contraband.106 Subsequently, all but one court 
addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of hash-evidence 
held that law enforcement’s warrantless use of the evidence, 
obtained from an ECSP, was constitutional.107 
However, the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v. 
United States fundamentally altered the constitutional framework 
for assessing the fit of novel technologies within preexisting 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.108 In doing so, the Court cast doubt 
on the propriety of the third-party doctrine; which has 
reverberating effects on how the Fourth Amendment will be 
applied in the digital age.109 
Although Carpenter marks a shift away from established 
Fourth Amendment principles, it is not the first time the Court has 
reevaluated how the amendment should be applied.110 Moreover, 
the Fourth Amendment is dynamic and subject to periodic 
reevaluation as technology advances.111 The following Subsection 
provides background on the Supreme Court’s struggle to 
consistently apply the Fourth Amendment through shifting 
constitutional jurisprudence and technological advances. 
 
105 Cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
106 Hash searches, like dog sniffs, provide information in binary: Either yes, the 
hash value of some file on a suspect’s computer matches the hash value of some 
known piece of child pornography, or no, it does not. See Illinois v. Caballes, 
543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); 
infra Part I.C.4. 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306–08 (10th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *8 
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017); United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 
2018). But see United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (M.D. Pa. 2008). 
108 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
111 See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). 
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1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.112 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the “basic purpose” of the Fourth amendment “is to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by governmental officials.”113 However, for much of 
Fourth Amendment history, whether a government surveillance 
technique was deemed a “search,” subject to constitutional 
scrutiny, was tied to common law trespass and focused on whether 
the government “obtain[ed] information by physically intruding [] 
a constitutionally protected area.”114 
Then, in response to law enforcement’s rampant use of 
wiretaps, the Court reshaped Fourth Amendment protections by 
stating that the Fourth Amendment applies “to people, not places,” 
and therefore is triggered when the government accesses 
information that an individual reasonably expects to remain 
private.115 Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set forth a two-step 
test for determining whether an individual possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy (“REP”) in what is searched or seized.116 
First, an individual must have an actual, subjective expectation of 
privacy (“subjective prong”).117 Second, one’s subjective 
expectation must be recognized by society as reasonable 
(“objective prong.”)118 Existing customs, social policies, and 
norms determine which privacy expectations are objectively 
reasonable.119 
Since Katz, the Supreme Court has grounded its Fourth 
Amendment decisions in whether an individual possessed a 
 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
113 Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
114 Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3. 
115 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
116 Id. at 361–63 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 361. 
118 Id. 
119 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1981) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(privacy expectations reflect the customs and values of the existing society). 
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REP.120 However, courts and scholars121 alike have criticized a 
privacy-centric approach to Fourth Amendment protection in an 
era of significantly diminished privacy.122 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Carpenter cast considerable doubt on the REP 
framework, which in turn has weakened the foundation on which 
doctrines grounded in a REP stand.123 
The following sub-section begins by discussing the flaws of a 
privacy-centric approach to Fourth Amendment protection in an 
era where private corporations comprehensively track and share 
consumer behavior data.124 Next, it analyzes the Carpenter Court’s 
decision to deviate from a route application of the REP test, and 
focus on the class of information sought instead of the actions of 
law enforcement.125 Third, it analyzes the third-party doctrine, 
which the Carpenter Court ruled does not extend to CSLI collected 
for more than seven days. Fourth, it examines the private search 
doctrine, a sub-set of the third-party doctrine. Finally, it considers 
the binary search doctrine. The following discussion of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine highlights Carpenter’s powerful impact on 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, far beyond the narrow fact-
pattern before the Court. 
 
120 See e.g., United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
121 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley v. California, 134 
S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see generally Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World 
Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012). 
122 See generally Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without 
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012). 
123 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
124 See Ohm, supra note 122, at 1310 (“Every year, companies, especially 
those that deliver services online, spend millions of dollars developing new 
services that track, store, and share the words, movements, and even the 
thoughts of their customers. These invasive services have proved to be 
irresistible to consumers, who have voluntarily embraced them in droves 
launching a social age of self-revelation.”). 
125 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
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2. An Objective, Privacy-Centric Approach in a “World 
Without Privacy” 
Courts have struggled to consistently apply both the subjective 
and objective prongs of the REP test since its inception.126 
Moreover, scholars have argued that the subjective component of 
the test has become a “phantom doctrine”127—reducing Katz to a 
“one step” inquiry: does society think it is reasonable to expect that 
the information or item sought by the government will remain 
private?128 
The subjective prong of the REP test has lost its bite, because 
courts treat it as an inquiry into whether the citizen, in her mind, 
believed the information would remain private.129 For example, did 
an individual actually believe that the content of her text messages, 
sent with a government-issued pager, would remain private?130 The 
problem with this inquiry is that it never seems to matter.131 A 
criminal defendant will (and should) always argue that they 
expected their information would be kept private from law 
enforcement’s prying eye. Moreover, it is difficult to adduce 
evidence rebutting a person’s self-reported mental state.132 Thus, 
 
126 See Tom McInnis, The Changing Definition of Search or Seizure, 11 
INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 10, 10–13 (2011) https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/images
/public_education/presentations/ChangingDefinitionsofSearch.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3LJ-ME84]. Although part of the Katz test is supposed to be 
objective, without a standardized method for determining what personal 
expectations of privacy society is willing to accept, the conclusion has been 
depending on the shifting social and political views of the members of the Court. 
Id. at 12. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that 
the use of a thermal imaging device to monitor radiation of heat from a person’s 
home requires a warrant), with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) 
(holding that aerial surveillance of a home does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment). 
127 Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective 
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113 (2015). 
128 See generally id. 
129 Id. 
130 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
131 Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 57). 
132 This is not to say that a court will never find that a defendant lacked a 
subjective expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
742 (1979) (holding that it is doubtful “people in general entertain any actual 
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the Court is almost never confronted with a scenario where the 
subjective prong of the REP test fails, but the objective prong does 
not.133 
The Carpenter Court implicitly accepted the one-step approach 
to Katz by ignoring the test’s subjective prong.134 The opinion 
never mentioned the word “subjective,” nor did it attempt to divide 
its analysis of the defendant’s subjective and objective 
expectations of privacy.135 But, as Professor Ohm states 
“Carpenter did not put a nail in the coffin of the subjective prong, 
because it was interred six feet under long ago.”136 
Further, premising Fourth Amendment protection solely on an 
objective, societally recognized privacy expectation is concerning 
in the digital era. Due to the vast amount of information Americans 
share with third-parties as a pre-requisite to be productive 
members of modern society,137 and the growth of the “internet of 
things,”138 it can be argued that there are few categories of 
 
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial”). Similarly, the prosecution 
very well may adduce sufficient evidence rebutting a defendant’s claim that they 
actually expected their information to be kept private. See, e.g., id. (“All 
telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone 
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their 
calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company 
has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they 
see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen 
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies ‘for the 
purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and preventing 
violations of law.’” (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174–
75 (1977)). 
133 See Ohm, supra note 131, at 56. 
134 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
135 Ohm, supra note 131, at 57. 
136 Id. at 58; see also Kerr, supra note 127, at 114 (explaining that the 
subjective prong of the REP test was abandoned in the 1970s and 1980s). 
137 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (holding that using a cellphone is 
not “voluntary”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (emphasizing how 
a cell phone is vital to participation in modern life.).  
138 The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is the concept that almost any device with an 
on and off switch can be connected to the internet and other devices. The IoT 
thus makes up a network of connected devices and people. The analyst firm 
Gartner estimates that by 2020 there will be over 26 billion devices connected to 
the IoT. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’ 
FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
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information that society reasonably believes will remain private.139 
To elaborate, the rise of cloud computing, social networking, and 
market reliance on Big Data, begets a world where citizens cannot 
reasonably expect that the majority of their digital data will remain 
private.140 
As Professor Ohm warns, we are headed toward a “world 
without privacy.”141 In such a world, it would be futile for 
individuals to expect that most of their personal information will 
remain private. Thus, a Fourth Amendment built around reasonable 
expectations of privacy will no longer be effective. 
C. Impact of United States v. Carpenter on the REP Test 
As mentioned above the, the Carpenter Court did not engage in 
a two-step REP inquiry.142 Instead, the Chief Justice enumerated 
three factors, aimed at the class of information sought, to 
 
/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#2a401ae71d09 [https://perma.cc/LDY6-QFV7]. 
139 See id. Since consumers know that many household products from 
refrigerators to toasters are now internet compatible, and often equipped with 
voice or video monitoring capabilities, people have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than in generations past. 
140 See Ohm, supra note 122, at 1317–18. First, cloud computing, the 
movement of computing and storage facilities to distant servers operated by 
ECSPs, led to billions of users storing their communications and writings with 
third-parties. Before the advent of could-based email services, like Gmail and 
Hotmail, people used email accounts provided by their employers or ISPs. 
Information on these accounts was saved periodically and locally. Now, billions 
of users systematically store messages and writings on third-party servers. 
Moreover, as discussed supra, user’s metadata can be accessed by law 
enforcement with a mere court order—without a warrant or showing of probable 
cause. Next, the rise of social networking platforms capitalize on people’s innate 
desire to connect with others. Since people feel connection (and entertainment) 
from using, and sharing personal information on these sites, the rise of social 
networking provides electronic service providers with mass amounts of user data 
that other types of ECSPs would never have access to. Finally, the widespread 
use of data analytics to monetize user data by drawing inferences, known as 
“Big Data,” diminishes any expectation of privacy users have over their personal 
information. For example, companies can “re-identify” anonymized data by 
applying an algorithm. Even if users take measures to ensure that their data is 
anonymized, by removing any identifying markers, companies can restore the 
identity of the data’s owner by analyzing patterns in the data. Id. at 1315–17. 
141 See generally id. 
142 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
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determine if the Fourth Amendment was invoked—marking a 
notable shift away from a Fourth Amendment analysis focused 
solely on privacy expectations.143 Notwithstanding well-settled 
precedent that an individual lacks an objective expectation of 
privacy in business records maintained by a third party, the Court 
held that a search occurred when warrantless cell-site location 
information (“CSLI”) records were obtained by the government.144 
The Carpenter Court resolved whether a warrant is required for 
law enforcement to retrieve historic145 CSLI, that is collected and 
maintained by private companies for legitimate business 
purposes.146 A cell-site is a cellular telephone “tower,” owned by a 
wireless carrier, where radio signals are received from customer’s 
cell phones.147 When a cell phone user makes a call, sends a text 
message or email, accesses the internet, or in any way connects to 
their cellular network, their cell-phone establishes a radio 
connection with the closest cell-tower.148 Wireless service 
providers create records (“CSLI records”) each time a cell-phone 
connects to a specific tower.149 As a cell phone user moves, their 
 
143 Id. at 2223. 
144 Id. Probable cause is only required if CSLI records are collected for more 
than six days. Id. at 2224 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
145 Historical location information refers to “[r]ecords stored by the wireless 
service provider that detail the location of a cell phone in the past (i.e.: prior to 
entry of the court order authorizing government acquisition).” Prospective 
location information refers to “all cell site information that is generated after the 
government has received court permission to acquire it.” You may also come 
across the term “real time” location information. This is a subset of prospective 
location information, and “refers to data used by the government to identify the 
location of a phone at the present moment.” In re Application for Order of a Pen 
Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 2005). 
146 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206. 
147 Cell Phone Location Tracking, BERKELEY L., 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-
Tracking-Primer_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YVE-R6NX] (last visited Jan. 30, 
2019). 
148 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
149 Id. Compare the information revealed in CSLI records at issue in Carpenter 
(for a phone call, a wireless service provider records the date, time, and duration 
of the call; the phone numbers making and receiving the call; the cell site 
“pinged” when the call was made, and the specific connection that made the 
connection, in its CSLI record) with the pen register used in Smith v. Maryland. 
See 422 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). 
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phone will send radio signals to multiple cell towers.150 The 
location of these cell towers can be used to estimate the location of 
an individual through triangulation.151 
The circumstances giving rise to the Carpenter case arose after 
police arrested four men suspected of a string of robberies of, 
ironically, T-Mobile stores.152 One of the men confessed, and 
provided police with the phone numbers of several accomplices.153 
Based on this information, prosecutors applied for a § 2703(d) 
Order to obtain cell-phone records for Carpenter and several 
others.154 Two orders were granted directing Carpenter’s wireless 
carrier, Sprint, to produce his cell-site location information 
(“CSLI”) to law enforcement.155 Between the two orders, the 
government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging the 
defendant’s movements over 127 days.156 At trial, the prosecution 
offered the CSLI records to show that the defendant was near four 
of the robbery locations at the time they occurred.157 The 
defendant’s motion to suppress the CSLI evidence was denied, and 
he was convicted.158 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
holdings.159 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that law 
enforcement may not collect historical CSLI for more than seven 
days without a warrant.160 More importantly, it held that CSLI is 
 
150 See BERKELEY L., supra note 147. 
151 Id. 
152 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
153 Id. 
154 Pursuant to the SCA, law enforcement can require a wireless carrier to 
disclose “a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer 
of such service . . . when the government entity . . . offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d) (2010); supra Part I.A.3. Although 
what constitutes “probable cause” is debated and fact specific, the reasonable 
suspicion standard is significantly lower than the probable cause standard. See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). 
155 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 2212–13. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 2213. 
160 Id. at 2217 n.3. 
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protected “[w]hether the Government employs its own surveillance 
technology . . . or leverages the technology of a wireless 
carrier.”161 
When assessing whether information was “searched,” the 
Carpenter court shifted away from the Katz REP analysis, to a 
multi-factor test.162 Justice Roberts set forth three factors, aimed at 
the category of information sought by law enforcement.163 Lower 
courts assessing whether a search of information held by a third-
party occurred must now ask whether the category of information 
(1) has a deeply revealing nature; (2) possesses depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach; and (3) results from an inescapable and 
automatic form of data collection.164 
Notably, the Court’s focus on the type of information sought, 
alone, marks a fundamental shift in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, which traditionally focuses on the actions taken by 
law enforcement while obtaining such information.165 Under 
Robert’s new test, a court determining whether a search occurred 
will assess the “depth” and “breadth” of information held by a 
third-party.166 Since there are no mandatory data retention 
regulations governing ECSPs, it is up to the individual company to 
decide how long to retain consumer data.167 Therefore, when 
applied, the “depth” and “breadth” factor discussed by Roberts will 
mandate that a district court delve into the decisions of private 
businesses, specifically: how long the business keeps consumer 
 
161 Id. at 2217.  
162 See id. at 2223. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (asserting that the 
“reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment has been consistently 
construed to regulate governmental action); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967) (scrutinizing law enforcement’s actions to determine whether the 
Fourth Amendment was violated). 
166 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
167 See Ernesto Van der Sar, How Long Does Your ISP Store IP-Address 
Logs?, TORRENT FREAK (June 29, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/how-long-
does-your-isp-store-ip-address-logs-120629/ [https://perma.cc/KSJ5-26VL]. 
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data and how much data it keeps, in assessing whether a search 
occurred.168 
The next Subsection will discuss Carpenter’s determination 
that CSLI is protected even when the government leverages the 
technology of a wireless carrier, which is a marked departure from 
the third-party doctrine. The third-party doctrine is grounded in the 
REP approach.169 
1. The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine, as articulated in Smith and Miller, 
states that an individual does not retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in non-content information voluntarily conveyed to third 
parties, such as telephone numbers or bank records.170 Thus, such 
information does not receive Fourth Amendment protection. 171 
The rationale underlying the third-party doctrine stems from two 
common law rules: the “assumption of risk”172 doctrine and the 
“voluntary exposure”173 doctrine. 
First, the Supreme Court has held that when a person shares 
secrets with another, they “assume the risk” of disclosure and lose 
any Fourth Amendment protection over that information, “even if 
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third-
 
168 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. Companies must balance the potential 
benefits of having access to old data, against the cost of storing data, and threats 
of a breach, in formulating their data retention policies. See Ohm, supra note 
131, at 31–32. 
169 The Smith Court held, after “applying the Katz analysis,” that the defendant 
did not possess a REP in metadata collected by a pen register since “people in 
general [do not] entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they 
dial.” 442 U.S. 735, 741–42 (1979) (holding “all telephone users realize that 
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”). 
170 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–
44. 
171 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46. 
172 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966). 
173 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Dow Chem. Co. 
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986) (articulating the “knowing exposure” 
doctrine). 
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party will not be betrayed.”174 Second, the Court held in Katz that 
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”175 
Based on the assumption of risk and voluntary exposure rules, 
the Miller Court, applying the Katz test, reasoned that a person 
cannot subjectively expect that what he knowing tells a third-party 
will, in every case, remain secret.176 Miller also emphasized that no 
objective privacy expectation exists to protect against the risk that 
information related to another may be eventually given to the 
government.177 This proposition has come to be known as the 
third-party doctrine.178 Courts have categorically applied the third-
party doctrine to circumstances where information shared online 
with an ECSP is later accessed by the police.179 
Although Carpenter’s precise impact on the third-party 
doctrine is hotly debated, the Court rejected the longstanding view 
that the doctrine categorically prohibited a Fourth Amendment 
analysis whenever information is voluntarily conveyed to a third-
 
174 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 
(1971) (deciding electronic surveillance of voluntary conversations between 
defendant and an informant does not constitute Fourth Amendment violation); 
Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 293 (1966) (finding that defendant’s trust in an accomplice 
does not create a legitimate expectation of privacy which would be infringed by 
the accomplice’s delivery of incriminating information to the government). 
175 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
176 Miller, 425 U.S. at 449. 
177 Id. at 443 (“The depositor takes the risk that the financial information he 
reveals to the bank may be relayed to the government.”). 
178 See id. at 435; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
179 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI); ACLU v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the National 
Security Agency’s mass metadata collection program did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because of the third-party doctrine); United States v. Graham, 846 
F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012) (holding that historical CSLI is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment because of the third-party doctrine); see 
also Ohm, supra note 122, at 1327–28 (“A court could reasonably hold that 
some of the content posted to Facebook has been knowingly exposed to the 
public, and following conventional Fourth Amendment law, rule that it may be 
obtained by the police without a warrant.”). 
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party.180 After rejecting a bright-line rule, the Court implicitly 
adopted petitioner’s argument that the third-party doctrine only 
“diminishes the degree of privacy;” and set up a hierarchical 
standard that focuses on the nature of the information sought; to 
determine the proper, subsequent Fourth Amendment analysis.181 
Put differently, individuals will retain a diminished privacy interest 
in information that is more revealing, comprehensive, and 
inescapably collected, than the information at issue in Smith and 
Miller.182 Additionally, a third-party’s maintenance of such 
information will not render it automatically outside of the Fourth 
Amendment’s scope.183 
Before assessing the private search doctrine, it is helpful to 
discuss its intimate connection to the third-party doctrine.184 After 
all, the private search doctrine stems from the same rationales and 
implicates the same issues with ECSPs as the third-party 
doctrine.185 Both the private search and third-party doctrines rely 
on the idea that “[a] private search extinguishes an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the object searched . . . .”186 In 
both circumstances, courts have held that once frustration of an 
individual’s expectation of privacy occurs by a private actor, the 
 
180 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018) (“[T]here is a 
world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed 
in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information 
collected by wireless carriers.”); cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 
(2014) (rejecting the formerly categorical application of the search incident to 
arrest doctrine articulated in Robinson and holding that a cell-phone cannot be 
searched incident to a lawful arrest). 
181 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402). 
182 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
183 See id. at 2217, 2223; Orin Kerr, Understanding the Supreme Court’s 
Carpenter Decision, LAWFARE (June 22, 2018, 1:18 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/understanding-supreme-courts-carpenter-decision 
[https://perma.cc/F5AU-JZUB]. 
184 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
185 See id. 
186 Priscilla Grantham Adams, Fourth Amendment Applicability: Private 
Searches, U. MISS. SCH. L.: NAT’L CTR. FOR JUST. & RULE L. 1–2 (2008), 
http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/ncjrl/pdf/PrivateSearchDoctrine.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BG38-TE6E]. 
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Fourth Amendments does not prohibit governmental use of the 
now “non-private information.”187 
Justice White, in his concurrence in Jacobsen, notes that the 
private search doctrine “shares many of the doctrinal 
underpinnings of cases establishing that ‘the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third 
party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.’”188 
Moreover, in first articulating the private search doctrine as we 
conceptualize it today, Justice Stevens explained that the rule 
“follows from the analysis applicable when private parties reveal 
other kinds of private information to the authorities.”189 He 
supports this assertion by noting that the Court repeatedly held that 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit Government use of 
information revealed by a third-party, even if that information was 
revealed “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited 
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”190 Justice Stevens’ quote comes directly from Miller, 
the case articulating the third-party doctrine.191 
2. Private Search Doctrine 
The Court addressed the implications of a private party 
revealing information to law enforcement, outside of the context of 
records held by a third-party, in United States v. Jacobsen.192 In 
Jacobsen, two FedEx employees opened a damaged package 
pursuant to a company policy regarding insurance claims.193 Upon 
inspecting the package, the employees found a series of four zip 
lock bags, the innermost containing six and a half ounces of white 
powder.194 The employees notified law enforcement (“DEA”), and 
placed the plastic bags back inside the package.195 When the DEA 
 
187 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
188 Id. at 130 (White, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 443 (1976)). 
189 Id. at 117 (majority opinion). 
190 Id. (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
191 See id. 
192 See generally id. 
193 Id. at 111.  
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
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agent arrived, he opened the package from the end that had already 
been visibly opened by the employees, opened each bag, and 
removed a small amount of white substance to submit to a field test 
for cocaine.196 Jacobsen challenged the DEA’s opening of the 
package and testing of the powder as a warrantless search in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.197 Expanding on its 
recent decision in Walter, 198 the majority concluded that the DEA 
agent had not conducted a “search,” because he had not exceeded 
the scope of the previous private search when he opened the 
package and removed the plastic bags.199 In explaining its 
rationale, the Court explicitly based its conclusion on the 
assumption of risk doctrine: when a party reveals private 
information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will 
reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs, the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that 
information.200 Moreover, the Court restated its holding in Miller, 
that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and then conveyed by him to 
Government authorities.”201 
Today, Jacobsen stands for the proposition that a government 
search that merely replicates a previous private search is not 
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.202 A constitutional analysis 
 
196 Id. at 111–12.  
197 See infra Part I.C.4 (discussing the role of the binary search doctrine in 
Jacobsen.).  
198 The Supreme Court in Walter held that law enforcement’s warrantless 
viewing of contraband video, voluntarily given to them a private party, who 
viewed portions of the video, constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Since law 
enforcement gained substantially more knowledge from viewing the video than 
it had when it received the video from the private party, its actions expanded the 
formerly private search and required probable cause. Walter v. United States, 
447 U.S. 649 (1980). 
199 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116–20. 
200 Id. at 117 (“This standard follows from the analysis applicable when private 
parties reveal other kinds of private information to the authorities. It is well 
settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, 
and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of 
that information.”).  
201 Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). 
202 See generally id. 
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is only triggered if the government search exceeds the scope of the 
private search.203 Further, since the Constitution proscribes only 
government action, the Court has held that regardless of whether 
private action is reasonable or unreasonable, accidental or 
deliberate, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment because of its 
private nature.204 
3. The Private Search Doctrine in Hashing Cases 
All but one federal court205 ruled that law enforcement’s 
acquisition and use of hash-evidence is not a Fourth Amendment 
search, because an ECSP typically identifies the “matching” 
images as contraband and submits them to NCMEC before law 
enforcement views them: implicating the private search doctrine.206 
 
203 See Walter, 447 U.S. at 657. 
204 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115. 
205 In 2008, the Middle District of Pennsylvania was the first court to address 
the Fourth Amendment implications of warrantless hash-value matching in 
United States v. Crist. Although the Crist court concluded that the “running of 
hash values” is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, the case is 
inapplicable to this Note for two reasons. First, the private search that uncovered 
child pornography on Crist’s computer was conducted by a human—not an 
ECSP. Second, the Court swiftly held, without rationale, that by “subjecting [an] 
entire computer to a hash value analysis –every file, internet history, picture, and 
‘buddy list’ became available for government review [and] [s]uch examination 
constitutes a search.” This proposition is inaccurate because it misconstrues 
what hashing exposes to an observer. First, hash-values are predictors of data 
that reveal no more about content than a random number. Thus, exposing a 
hash-value to a government agent does not allow the agent to “review” the 
underlying file, in the sense the Crist court indicated. See 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 
585 (M.D. Pa. 2008). The Court in United States v. Keith expressed this 
proposition by holding that “matching the hash value of a file to a stored hash 
value is not the virtual equivalent of viewing the contents of the file. What the 
match says is that the two files are identical; it does not itself convey any 
information about the contents of the file.” Second, unlike a label, a hash-value 
has no inherent meaning. See 980 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D. Mass. 2013). The 
Miller Court, in regard to Google’s hashing policy, explained that a hash value 
only acquires meaning “when it matches with a hash value in the child 
pornography repository and therefore reminds Google that it has seen this image 
before.” United States v. Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *5 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 
2017). Lastly, the hashing process only works in one direction and a government 
agent cannot “reverse” a hash-value back to the file it identified. See supra Part 
I.A. 
206 See infra Part I.A.3. 
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Last year, the Fifth Circuit mechanically applied the private 
search doctrine in denying a motion to suppress hash-evidence in 
United States v. Reddick.207 In Reddick, a Microsoft user uploaded 
a digital file to Microsoft Skydrive, a cloud hosting service.208 
Skydrive employs a program called PhotoDNA, which discerns the 
hash values of user uploaded files and compares them against the 
hash values of known child pornography.209 Based on a hash value 
match between defendant’s file, and a file known to contain child 
pornography, Microsoft sent the file and defendant’s Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address to NCMEC’s CyberTipline.210 NCMEC 
then sent its report (“CyberTip”) to the local police department 
where the defendant lived.211 Upon receiving the CyperTip, a 
detective opened each of the suspect files, confirmed they 
contained child pornography, and applied for a warrant to search 
defendant’s home.212 Defendant was arrested, and following his 
indictment, he moved to suppress all evidence of child 
pornography on the grounds that the detective’s warrantless 
opening of the files associated with the CyperTip was an unlawful 
search.213 The District Court denied defendant’s motion, holding 
that although the detective’s viewing of the files invaded a 
constitutional expectation of privacy, the evidence supported a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.214 The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed, but disagreed with the district court that the initial 
viewing of the files violated the Fourth Amendment.215 The Circuit 
Court reasoned that the present situation fell squarely within the 
private search issue presented in Jacobsen—analogizing the 
 
207 See generally United States v. Reddick, 900 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2018). 
208 “Cloud server hosting is when hosting services are made available to 
customers on demand via the Internet. Rather than being provided by a single 
server or virtual server, cloud server hosting services are provided by multiple 
connected servers that comprise a cloud.” Vangie Beal, Cloud Server Hosting, 
WEBOPEDIA https://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/cloud_server_hosting.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z76R-6827] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
209 Reddick, 900 F.3d at 637–38. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the private search doctrine). 
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contents of the files defendant uploaded to a physical package. 216 
The Court reasoned that when the defendant uploaded the files to 
SkyDrive, Microsoft’s PhotoDNA program automatically reviewed 
them and compared them against an existing database.217 
Accordingly, Microsoft, a private actor “inspected and deemed 
[defendant’s ‘package’] suspicious,” before its contents were 
turned over to law enforcement, thereby frustrating any 
expectation of privacy the Defendant had in his files.218 
The analysis employed by the Reddick Court is consistent with 
other courts addressing the private search issue arising from the 
acquisition of hash-evidence.219 Since the private search doctrine 
was so firmly rooted in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence before 
Carpenter, courts faced with motions to suppress hash-evidence 
only analyzed whether: (1) law enforcement’s activities exceeded 
the scope of the ECSP’s private search; and (2) whether ECSP’s 
are government “agents” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.220 
The first issue, regarding the scope of the private search, 
requires a fact-specific inquiry into the actions of law enforcement 
upon receiving a NCMEC report. However, absent clear 
government overreach, all courts have found that a detective’s 
visual review of suspect images attached to a NCMEC report did 
 
216 “The exact issues presented by this case may be novel. But the governing 
constitutional principles set forth by the Supreme Court are not. The government 
effectively learned nothing from Detective Ilse’s viewing of the files that it had 
not already learned from the private search. Accordingly, under the private 
search doctrine, the government did not violate Reddick’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.” Reddick, 900 F.3d at 640. 
217 Id. at 639. 
218 Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
219 See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (2016); United States 
v. Miller, 2017 WL 2705963 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017). 
220 Since this Note argues that the Court deviate from the REP based private 
search doctrine, an analysis of the scope of a private search and government 
agency are outside the purview of the current discussion. But see, e.g., 
Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292 (holding that law enforcement exceeded the scope of 
AOL’s private search, when a detective opened four images attached to a 
NCMEC report, and only one of the images had matched a hash-value of a 
confirmed child pornographic image); Miller, 2017 WL 2705963 (holding that 
Google is not a government agent when it voluntarily scans email attachments 
for apparent child pornography). 
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not exceed the scope of the initial private search, because the 
detective knew with virtual certainty what the files contained.221 
Further, no court has held that the PROTECT Act’s reporting 
dynamic renders ECSP’s government actors for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.222 
4. The Binary Search Doctrine 
Moreover, in addition to the barrier erected by the private 
search doctrine, a defendant typically cannot suppress hash-
evidence because hash-value matching reveals information in the 
“binary.”223 Put differently, hash-value matching indicates the 
presence or absence of contraband, and nothing else.224 
The constitutionality of a different type of binary search—a 
field test for cocaine—was first raised in Jacobsen.225 There, the 
Court held that the test did not constitute a search pursuant to the 
binary search doctrine—articulated in dicta of United States v. 
Place.226 
In United States v. Place, the Supreme Court addressed the 
Fourth Amendment’s relevance to surveillance techniques that 
purportedly reveal only the presence or absence of contraband.227 
In Place, the Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment bars 
 
221 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 (employing “virtual certainty” test for 
determining scope of private search); Reddick, 900 F.3d at 639 (holding that the 
detective’s visual review of the files attached to a NCMEC report did not 
“‘significant[ly] expan[d] the search that had been conducted previously by a 
private party,’ sufficient to constitute ‘a separate search’”); Miller, 2017 WL 
2705963, at *4 (holding that the detective did not exceed Google’s private 
search since the detective had “near-certainty regarding what [he] would find 
and little chance to see much other than contraband”). 
222 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that AOL was not a “mere conduit” for the government and was thus 
not a government agent); Miller, 2017 WL 2705963, at *2 (holding “Google is 
not a government actor”); cf. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
614 (1989) (providing the rule that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, if a 
private individual conducts a search “as an instrument or agent of the 
Government,” that search is subject to constitutional scrutiny). 
223 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
224 See supra Part I.A.1. 
225 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109. 
226 Id. at 123–24 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 707). 
227 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
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law enforcement from temporarily detaining personal luggage for 
exposure to a canine sniff on the basis of a reasonable suspicion.228 
The majority concluded that Terry allowed the agents to briefly 
detain the passenger’s luggage.229 In arriving at this conclusion, the 
Court noted that the passenger’s luggage was seized to arrange its 
exposure to a narcotics detection dog.230 
Thus, the Court addressed, in dicta,231 whether the use of a 
narcotics detection dog was a “search.”232 If so, the Court 
reasoned, “the initial seizure of respondent’s luggage for the 
purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test—no matter how brief—
could not be justified on less than probable cause.”233 The majority 
answered this question in the negative, stating that “the canine 
sniff is sui generis . . . no other investigative procedure [] is so 
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained 
and in the content of the information revealed.”234 Specifically, 
“[a] ‘canine sniff’ . . . does not expose noncontraband items that 
otherwise would remain hidden from public view,” ensuring that 
“the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment 
and inconvenience entailed in . . . more intrusive investigative 
methods.”235 Additionally, the Court reasoned, “the sniff discloses 
only the presence or absence of narcotics, which is a contraband 
item. Thus, despite the fact that the sniff tells the authorities 
something about the contents of the luggage, the information is 
limited.”236 
Although the Court’s categorization of a canine sniff as “sui 
generis” was quickly contradicted, the reasoning articulated in 
Place—that a minimally intrusive technique which only reveals the 
 
228 Id. at 699.  
229 Id. at 706. 
230 Id. 
231 Lower courts “are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as 
firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when . . . a dictum . . . 
[is] not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.” McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 
950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991). 
232 Place, 426 U.S. at 706. 
233 Id.; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). 
234 Place, 426 U.S. at 707. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
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presence or absence of a contraband item—was applied the 
following year in Jacobsen.237 
The Jacobsen Court considered whether a field test, used to 
determine if a “suspicious white powder was cocaine . . . [and] 
nothing more” violated an expectation of privacy that society 
considered reasonable.238 Based on Place, the majority held that 
“governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is 
cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no 
legitimate privacy interest.”239 The Jacobsen majority contrasted a 
societally recognized expectation of privacy, protected by the 
Fourth Amendment, with a mere subjective belief that information 
will be kept private.240 The Court interestingly employed the 
example of “information voluntarily disclosed to a government[] 
informant” as information over which a defendant may have an 
actual expectation of privacy that is not objectively reasonable.241 
Emphasizing the importance of the REP test’s objective prong, the 
Court held that the narcotics field test did not constitute a search.242 
Subsequent cases addressing surveillance techniques that 
provide information in the binary have shifted away from the two-
factor analysis employed by Place and Jacobsen, focusing solely 
on the binary nature of the technique, and ignoring the level of 
intrusiveness on the citizen.243 Scholars have labeled this approach 
taken by courts as the “pure binary search doctrine.”244 
The policy implications of the binary search doctrine have 
faced considerable criticism, especially as surveillance technology 
 
237 The year after Place was decided, the Supreme Court analyzed another 
binary authentication method—a narcotics field test—under the Fourth 
Amendment in United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
238 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122. 
239 Id. at 123. 
240 Id. at 122. 
241 Id. at 123. 
242 Id. 
243 Compare United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983), and 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000), with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
244 Laurent Sacharoff, The Binary Search Doctrine, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1139, 
1145 (2014). 
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becomes more precise.245 The Place line of cases implies that the 
more tailored a surveillance technique is to detecting contraband, 
the less Fourth Amendment protection the public will have over 
what is being surveilled.246 This logic directly contradicts an 
“equilibrium adjustment”247 theory of the Fourth Amendment, and 
common sense. In criticizing the binary search doctrine, Aya 
Gruber248 asserts that:  
[i]f Caballes stands for the broad proposition that 
there is no search when only contraband is detected, 
then the government is free to deploy such 
contraband detecting devices in each and every one 
of our house on the ground that if we are innocent, 
we have nothing to hide . . .  all these devices could 
be employed on the sole bases of police hunches, 
whims, prejudices, or anything at all, because they 
are beyond the purview of the Fourth 
Amendment.249 
Moreover, the binary search doctrine is inconsistent with 
Fourth Amendment formalism—the prevailing school of thought 
on Fourth Amendment theory.250 
5. Formalist Approach to the Binary Search Doctrine 
Analyzing the constitutionality of the binary search doctrine 
requires a brief discussion of competing approaches to Fourth 
Amendment rights: the formalist approach and the innocence 
 
245 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 135–38 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Salgado, supra 
note 8. 
246 Marcia Hofmann, Arguing for Suppression of ‘Hash’ Evidence, CHAMPION, 
May 2009, at 20, 23. 
247 See infra Part I.A. 
248 Aya Gruber is a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado Law School 
and Scholar in the fields of gender and race law. Aya Gruber, COLO. L., 
https://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/profile.jsp?id=325 
[https://perma.cc/5QFV-RZS3] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
249 Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is 
Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 823–24 (2008). 
250 See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 
(2001). 
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approach.251 This Subsection reviews the competing approaches, in 
favor of the formalist view. 
Formalism, the majority approach, focuses solely on the 
quantum of evidence gathered by the state before conducting a 
search, and declines to identify or articulate any continuum of 
privacy entitlement turning on individual conduct.252 Formalism 
views the key feature of the amendment as the duties it places on 
government actors.253 Thus, an individual’s behavior—their guilt 
or innocence—is irrelevant in analyzing the scope of their 
constitutional protection.254 Under the formalist view, any 
violation of the Fourth Amendment constitutes cognizable harm, 
even if the subject of the search is factually guilty.255 
Although formalism is the prevailing approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court recognizes co-existing theories, 
allowing it to choose which theory to apply based on the specific 
facts of a given case.256 The binary search cases represent an 
innocence model of Fourth Amendment theory,257 which implies 
that harm only occurs when an innocent person is illegally 
searched.258 Such a model confers a greater privacy entitlement to 
the innocent than the guilty.259 The innocence model views the 
 
251 See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1462–63 (1996). 
252 Id. at 1466–67. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 1467.  
255 Id. “The set of parties injured by unreasonable searches thus consists of all 
persons searched without the appropriate level of pre-search knowledge on the 
part of the relevant public official. Accordingly, when the public official has the 
requisite prior knowledge, there is no violation of the right of privacy and no 
constitutional harm.” Id. 
256 Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 503, 507 (2007). 
257 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (“It is probably safe to 
assume that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable 
to those disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such 
cases, no legitimate interest has been compromised.” (emphasis added)).  
258 See id. at 137. 
259 C.f. id. (The binary search doctrine can only be supported by an innocence 
theory of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that assumes that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only the innocent.) In articulating the doctrine, the 
Jacobsen Court held that “Congress has decided-and there is no question about 
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Fourth Amendment as an “imperfect divining rod,” aimed at 
maximizing the number of “ideal” searches—those that reveal 
evidence of a crime.260 Arnold Loewy, a proponent of the 
innocence model, describes a hypothetical “divining rod” to 
demonstrate the goal of the Fourth Amendment under the 
innocence model: 
In a Utopian society, each policeman would be 
equipped with an evidence-detecting divining rod. 
He would walk up and down the streets and 
whenever the divining rod detected evidence of 
crime, it would locate the evidence. First, it would 
single out the house, then it would point to the 
room, then the drawer, and finally the evidence 
itself. Thus, all evidence of crime would be 
uncovered in the most efficient possible manner, 
and no innocent person would be subject to a 
search. In a real society (such as ours), the fourth 
amendment serves as an imperfect divining rod.261 
Loewy’s divining rod, which he hypothesized in 1983, posits a 
perfectly efficient binary search.262 In the context of child 
pornography prosecutions, Loewy’s divining rod exists—hash-
value matching.263 The propriety of Loewy’s approach boils down 
to which harms one believes the Fourth Amendment is intended to 
prevent. This Note agrees with the formalist view that society has a 
collective right to government compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, therefore, a violation of the right constitutes harm 
even when it reveals evidence of criminal wrongdoing. 
 
its power to do so-to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as 
illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is 
cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy 
interest.” Id. at 123. Thus, the Court based its articulation of the doctrine on the 
proposition that there is no Forth Amendment protection over illicit activity; an 
innocence theory of the amendment.  
260 See generally Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for 
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983). 
261 Id. at 1244. 
262 See id. 
263 See supra Part I.A.1. 
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The Court’s endorsement of a formalist approach to the Fourth 
Amendment is illustrated by its focus on state action when 
reviewing a motion to suppress evidence.Whether a defendant can 
utilize his Fourth Amendment rights (and move to exclude 
evidence against him) depends on the actions of a third-party. 
Specifically, this inquiry focuses on whether the state has 
established probable cause.264 The Court’s focus on state action is 
further exemplified by judicially recognized exceptions, 
“excusing” officers from the probable cause requirement on the 
premise that their behavior was justified by, among other reasons, 
fear for their own, or public safety.265 The result of this state-
focused analysis is that an individual retains a privacy right until 
the state acquires enough knowledge of criminal activity to invade 
that right.266 
The paradox of defining an individual right by the conduct of 
someone aside from the right holder can be rationalized by viewing 
an analog, collective right to the Fourth Amendment procedure 
itself, implicating different policy concerns than those implicated 
when one’s substantive right is violated.267 Thus, in an important 
sense, the right conferred by the amendment is that the government 
complies with its probable cause and reasonableness 
requirements.268 If a collective right is recognized to safeguard 
procedure, all of society is harmed when that procedure is not 
complied with.269 
A proponent of the innocence approach may counter the above 
assertion by correctly noting that the boundaries of a Fourth 
Amendment right holder’s protection are partially determined by 
 
264 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Loewy, supra note 260 at 1240. 
265 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (articulating the public 
safety exception to the warrant requirement); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 3 
(1968) (establishing that if a police officer has a reasonable suspicion that a 
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a 
reasonable belief that the person “may be armed and presently dangerous,” the 
officer can briefly seize and search the suspect without a warrant). 
266 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
267 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides a substantive 
right to be free from unreasonable government scrutiny. See id. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
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their own actions. For example, an individual can forfeit their right 
in multiple ways, such as indicating the lack of an expectation of 
privacy or creating circumstances that are objectively dangerous to 
law enforcement or society.270 However, if an analog collective 
right to procedural integrity is recognized, an unreasonable search 
that uncovers evidence of a crime is still unconstitutional.271 In 
such a scenario, an individual may have forfeited her substantive 
right to be free of unreasonable government scrutiny, but, the state 
still violated society’s collective right securing procedural 
indignity by invading a target’s privacy without a sufficient 
evidentiary foundation.272 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM 
“The Constitution is premised on an ordinary rate 
of change in the balance of power between the state 
and the people. The Fourth Amendment is our 
national thermostat, recalibrating what the police 
can and cannot do.”273 
In an era of unprecedented technological innovation, the Court 
must grapple with when and how to adjust the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment to maintain its core protections. Regarding the when, 
this Note argues that if a new technology is “exceptional,” the law 
must inevitably adjust its approach to assessing disputes arising 
from that technology. An exceptional technology is one that 
disrupts the balance of power maintained by the Fourth 
Amendment.274 Regarding the how, this Note proposes that Courts 
should decline to apply traditional, “mono-analogical”275 reasoning 
 
270 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (establishing that 
leaving evidence in plain view forfeits privacy right); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that knowing exposure of information to a 
third-party forfeits one’s Fourth Amendment protection).  
271 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
272 See id. 
273 Ohm, supra note 131, at 59.  
274 See infra Part I.A.1. 
275 “The term ‘mono-analogical’ designates a brand of analogical reasoning 
where only a single dimension of a subject is mapped.” Luke M. Milligan, 
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in assessing whether a novel technology is subject to a pre-existing 
legal doctrine.276 Mono-analogical reasoning refers to a type of 
analogical reasoning where only a single dimension of a subject is 
mapped—typically, the subject’s function.277 This Note argues that 
a multi-dimensional, “poly-analogical” approach should be 
employed when assessing the fit of an exceptional technology 
within pre-existing doctrine. When digital information is searched, 
the dimensions assessed should track the three factors delineated 
by Roberts in Carpenter: (1) “the deeply revealing nature” of the 
information revealed, (2) the information’s “depth, breath, and 
comprehensive reach,” and (3) “the inescapable and automatic 
nature of [the information’s] collection.”278 The Carpenter factors 
look beyond the function of the technology employed, to the nature 
of the information revealed by the surveillance.279 
Part II first explores the inherently unstable nature of the 
Fourth Amendment. Next, it discusses what makes a technology 
“exceptional,” requiring the Court to deviate from conventional, 
mono-analogical reasoning. This Part proposes that a technology is 
exceptional if it throws off the existing balance of Fourth 
Amendment power. Further, it proposes a cost-focused, “structural 
privacy rights” approach to determining if the existing balance has 
been disrupted. In short, this approach posits that if a new 
technology costs significantly less for the government to employ, it 
will likely eviscerate an implicit, non-legal right, which disrupts 
the constitutional balance. Further, this Part explains the flaws of 
mono-analogical legal reasoning, and why it cannot account for 
exceptional technologies. Finally, it analyzes how the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Riley and Carpenter considered technological 
exceptionalism in applying a comprehensive, poly-analogical 
analysis to fundamentally change Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
 
Analogy Breakers: A Reality Check on Emerging Technologies, 80 MISS. L.J. 
1319, 1320 (2011). 
276 See supra Part I.C. 
277 Milligan, supra note 275, at 1323–24. 
278 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
279 See id. 
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A. A Dynamic Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”280 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment “is 
to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”281 In theory, the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, mandating that an 
officer must acquire a warrant, founded on “probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” acts 
as this critical safeguard.282 
But, in reality, a warrantless government search or seizure can 
still comply with the Fourth Amendment if it falls into one of the 
many exceptions to the warrant requirement.283 The label 
“exception” is a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches 
occur more often than searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.284 
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, the Court 
generally determines whether to exempt a given type of search 
from the warrant requirement “by assessing, on one hand, the 
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on 
the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion 
of legitimate governmental interests.”285 
The Court’s ad hoc approach to invoking the warrant 
requirement has thus forged hundreds of seemingly unrelated 
rules—frustrating scholars, judges, and citizens alike.286 In 
 
280 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
281 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
282 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
283 See generally Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (explaining that the 
warrant requirement is subject to reasonable exceptions). 
284 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
285 Id. at 2484. 
286 In a 2009 interview, Justice Scalia discussed his hatred of Fourth 
Amendment cases, complaining that every case is so fact specific that a 
particular opinion merely answers “variation 3,542.” Interview by Susan Swain 
with Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, United States Supreme Court, in Wash. 
D.C. (June 19, 2009), https://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-1/supreme-court-
justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/V7QW-9FZS]; see also Samuel C. Rickless, The 
2019] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & HASH-VALUE MATCHING 1289 
 
response to the ostensibly jumbled mess of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, Professor Orin Kerr posits that the amendment’s 
interpretation must constantly change with advancing technologies 
and social norms.287 Professor Kerr reasons that the balance of 
power struck by the amendment, in any given technological and 
social era, is inherently unstable.288 Thus, the amendment is 
constantly adjusting its scope.289 When changing technology or 
social norms expand government power, the Supreme Court 
tightens Fourth Amendment protection; and when they threaten 
government power, the Court loosens constitutional protections.290 
Since technology alters how citizens commit crimes and how 
police catch them, new technologies threaten the balance between 
individual privacy and effective law enforcement by enabling both 
police and citizens to accomplish tasks they could not previously 
accomplish.291 Judges must respond to such changes to restore the 
preexisting level of police power, an approach Kerr calls 
“equilibrium adjustment.”292 
The Supreme Court’s approach to the infrared thermal imaging 
device at issue in Kyllo v. United States exemplifies Kerr’s 
theory.293 In Kyllo, police suspected that the defendant was 
growing marijuana inside his home using high intensity lamps.294 
Subsequently, police used a thermal imaging device, set up on a 
public street, to show that part of the defendant’s home was 
unusually hot.295 Police used this information to secure a warrant 
 
Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R.L.J. 261, 261 (2005) (“If there is any statement to which virtually all 
constitutional scholars would agree, it is that orthodox Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is a theoretical mess, full of doctrinal incoherence and 
inconsistency, revealing not much more than the constitutionally unmoored 
ideological predispositions of shifting majorities of Supreme Court justices.”). 
287 Kerr, supra note 111, at 480. 
288 Id. at 487. 
289 See id. at 480.  
290 Id. at 482. 
291 See generally id. 
292 Id. at 480; see also Ohm,  supra note 122, at 1312 (“I embrace [equilibrium 
adjustment] theory as not only a convincing description of what courts have 
done but also a normatively desirable theory of what courts should do.”). 
293 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
294 Id. at 27. 
295 Id. at 29–30. 
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to search the defendant’s home, resulting in criminal charges 
against the defendant and a Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
police’s warrantless use of the thermal imaging device.296 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Scalia framed the inquiry at issue as: what 
limits must the Court place on the power of technology to avoid 
the evisceration of individual liberties?297 Ultimately, the Court 
held that using sense enhancing technology to obtain information 
about the interior of the home “that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area’ constitutes a search.”298 Notably, the Court 
reasoned that its holding “assures preservation of the degree of 
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.”299 The Kyllo Court recognized that the 
police had gained an unfair advantage in determining facts due to 
technological innovation, and subsequently fashioned its ruling to 
address this imbalance and tighten Fourth Amendment 
safeguards.300 
However, Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory does not 
discuss the types of novel technologies that disturb the 
constitutional balance.301 The following sub-part discusses the kind 
of technological change that disrupts the Fourth Amendment 
equilibrium, requiring a departure from conventional legal 
analysis. This Note adopts Professor Ohm’s label and refers to 
such technologies as “exceptional.” 
1. Technological Exceptionalism 
The idea of exceptionalism is that “a person, place, object, or 
concept is qualitatively different from others in the same basic 
 
296 Id. 
297 See id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy 
secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by 
the advance in technology. . . . The question we confront today is what limits 
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed 
privacy.”). 
298 Id. at 34. 
299 Id. 
300 See generally id. 
301 See generally Kerr, supra note 111. 
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category.”302 If something is “exceptional,” it differs in meaningful 
respects from others of its kind.303 It follows that the law should 
depart from conventional analysis when assessing disputes arising 
from the exceptional thing.304 In departing from conventional 
analysis, the law should decline to analogize an exceptional thing 
to other “non-exceptional” things of its kind.305 
For instance, disputes at sea are treated as exceptional. Since 
there is no sovereign of the open sea, the laws of tort, property, and 
contract provide distinct rules to resolve maritime disputes.306 
Moreover, many scholars propose that the internet, like maritime 
law, constitutes a separate sovereign that no contemporary legal 
system can adequately govern.307 Thus, they argue that cyberspace 
should be treated differently, and that the law should engage in a 
standalone analysis when disputes arise.308 
Ryan Calo synthesizes this viewpoint in arguing that the field 
of Cyberlaw is premised on the idea that fundamental advances in 
technology—such as the internet—are so qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from what has come before, that they force 
the law to treat them differently.309 Calo defines a technology as 
exceptional, and thus requiring a standalone legal analysis, “when 
its introduction into the mainstream requires a systematic change 
to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or if necessary 
displace, an existing balance of values.”310 
At first glance, Calo’s definition seems circular, as it states: (1) 
if a technology is exceptional, it requires different treatment from 
the law; and (2) a technology will be deemed exceptional if it 
 
302 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 
550 (2015). 
303 Id. at 551. 
304 See id. 
305 See id. at 550. 
306 Id. at 551. 
307 Id. 
308 But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207–08 (arguing against internet exceptionalism by 
likening studying Internet law to studying “the law of the horse”). 
309 Calo, supra note 302, at 552. 
310 Id. 
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requires the law to treat it differently.311 However, Calo’s focus is 
pointed toward the technology’s impact on an existing balance of 
values—suggestive of Kerr’s equilibrium adjustment theory.312 In 
the Fourth Amendment context, this Note extrapolates Calo’s 
definition to state that a technology is exceptional if its function 
and other attributes meaningfully disturb the existing balance of 
values between effective law enforcement and individual 
privacy.313 If a technology is shown to disrupt the existing balance 
of Fourth Amendment values, it is exceptional, and should not be 
conventionally analogized to other technologies of its kind.314 
2. Quantifying What Renders a Technology “Exceptional” 
But, how do we quantify a disruption to the balance of Fourth 
Amendment values? Paul Ohm, in endorsing and expanding Kerr’s 
equilibrium adjustment theory, asserts that introducing “statistical 
quantities,” such as an empirical study showing the relative costs 
of police surveillance techniques,315 could evidence that a 
particular surveillance technique disturbed the constitutional 
balance.316 Ohm ratifies Bankston & Soltani’s317 focus on the 
relative costs of surveillance techniques as an acceptable metric to 
determine if the technique caused a constitutional imbalance.318 
This Note explores Bankston & Soltani’s cost-focused, 
structural privacy rights approach to determine if a new technology 
disrupts the Fourth Amendment. The cost-centric, structural 
privacy rights model is one way to lend rigor to the equilibrium 
 
311 See id. at 552–53. 
312 See Kerr, supra note 111, at 478. 
313 See infra Part I.A.3. 
314 See Calo, supra note 302, at 552–53. 
315 Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of 
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 335, 337–38 (2014). 
316 Ohm, supra note 122, at 1313. 
317 Askhan Soltani is an independent researcher and technologist specializing 
in privacy, security and behavioral economics. Bankston & Soltani, supra note 
315, at 357. Kevin Bankston is an activist and attorney who specializes in the 
areas of free speech and privacy law. Kevin Bankston, NEW AM., 
https://www.newamerica.org/our-people/kevin-bankston/ 
[https://perma.cc/UJ6S-Y4VP] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
318 See Ohm, supra note 131, at 22. 
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adjustment theory, by analyzing the consequences of a relaxation 
of financial constraints on law enforcement. It is not the only 
metric that can concretize if, and the extent to which, the Fourth 
Amendment balance has been disrupted. 
3. Cost-Centric Structural-Privacy Rights Approach to 
“Exceptionalism” 
Bankston & Soltani theorize that a Fourth Amendment search 
has occurred if a new technology makes it “much less expensive” 
to gather information than previous technologies.319 This 
proposition is underscored by Harry Surden’s theory of “structural 
privacy rights,” defined as: non-legal, implied regulations on 
government conduct that society has come to expect will not be 
infringed, due to physical and technological barriers preventing 
government acquisition of the information sought to remain 
private.320 As technology advances, technological barriers, 
specifically the high costs of engaging in long-term, 
comprehensive surveillance, erode, allowing government access to 
information formerly expected to remain private.321 As these 
barriers erode, individuals swiftly and permanently lose the 
underlying structural privacy right they once protected.322 Surden 
calls the diminution in “structural” privacy rights after the advent 
of a new technology, a “rights-shift.”323 
Further, structural privacy rights, are akin to “negative legal 
rights”324 that emanate from structural privacy constraints.325 
 
319 See Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 337. 
320 See Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 
1608–09 (2007). 
321 Id. 
322 See id. 
323 See id. at 1618; Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 339–41. Surden 
employs the term “rights-shift” to describe technology’s erosion of a structural 
right resulting in a gap in the regulatory scheme constraining infringements on 
societally recognized expectations of privacy. See Surden, supra note 320, at 
1618–19. 
324 Wesley Hohfeld defined individual legal rights in terms of how others are 
required to behave in relation to the rights holder. Moreover, he famously 
suggested that a “negative legal right” is created when others have a legal duty 
to refrain from behaviors that interfere with the rights holder. Joseph William 
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Moreover, advances in technology diminish a structural right 
indirectly, by removing a structural constraint.326 Structural 
privacy constraints, a type of “non-legal regulatory device,”327 
arise from the practical short-comings of the current technological 
and physical state of the world.328 Due to physical and 
technological limits, some information gathering activities will be 
so costly in resources and time, that they are effectively impossible 
to regularly execute.329 The presence of these costs implicitly 
curtail the behavior of law enforcement seeking such private 
information—by acting as a structural constraint on police 
behavior.330 In turn, society comes to expect that law enforcement 
will not engage in certain behaviors; conferring on them an 
expectation based, “negative structural right.”331 
 
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986–87. 
325 A structural privacy constraint can be seen to confer the structural privacy 
right. There is a parallel between a non-legal constraint mechanism, caused by 
practical limitations, and a legal right, created by judge or legislature, in that 
they both provide citizens with the same protection. In support of this 
proposition, Harry Surden, Fellow at the Stanford Center for Computers and the 
Law, posits that legal rights are created when others have a legal duty to refrain 
from behavior that interferes with the rights-holder. It follows from this 
definition that such a right would limit interference with a right-holder’s 
protection. The same outcome, limited interference with a rights-holder’ 
protection, is achieved through non-legal constraint mechanisms. Surden further 
emphasizes that non-legal constraint mechanisms may give rise to relationships 
between constraints and behaviors that are functionally equivalent to the 
relationships giving rise to legal rights. See Surden, supra note 320, at 1610–20. 
326 Id. 
327 “Non-legal regulatory devices” are also known as “alternative behavior 
regulators.” Id. at 1610. 
328 There are two types of structural constraints—explicit and latent. Latent 
structural constraints—which are more applicable to regulating private 
information—are the secondary costs arising from the current technological or 
physical state of the world. Put differently, the limitations of technology make 
some behaviors too timely or expensive to be conducted on a regular basis. Id. at 
1613. By contrast, an explicit structural constraint is an overt constraint on a 
behavior. The paradigm example of an explicit structural constraint is a physical 
fence surrounding a property. In that scenario, a certain behavior—entering the 
property—is constrained by the physical cost incurred by climbing over the 
fence. Id. at 1612.  
329 See generally id. 
330 See id. at 1614.  
331 Id. 
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For example, in Kyllo, the Court recognized that sense 
enhancing technology disrupted the status quo between police and 
citizens, because it gave police “x-ray vision” inside a suspect’s 
home, which was unavailable before the advent of thermal imaging 
technology.332 Thus, the “negative structural right” to be free from 
long-distance surveillance of the interior of one’s home was eroded 
by the advent of thermal imaging, thereby disrupting the Fourth 
Amendment balance. 
Structural privacy protections are especially important in the 
field of privacy law.333 Justice Alito remarked in his concurrence 
in Jones, that before the advent of the computer, “the greatest 
protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but 
practical.”334 Scholars thus assert that as structural privacy rights 
erode in the face of new technology, individual privacy protections 
are greatly diminished.335 Moreover, the implicit nature of a 
structural right renders it of little interest to policy makers: “[i]n 
other words, as long as some mechanism is acceptably constraining 
unwanted behavior, the underlying issue and the choice of 
mechanism will garner little attention.”336 Since it is easy for 
policy makers to overlook “rights-like” relationships that are not 
expressed by law, legislators focus little energy on codifying 
structural rights into legal ones.337 Thus, a structural right will 
rarely, if ever, be accompanied by a legal right conferring the same 
protection.338 Therefore, when a structural right dissolves, society 
is left with no regulation of the formerly curtailed behavior; 
resulting in a sharp shift in the regulatory framework.339 Harry 
Surden terms this phenomenon a “rights-shift.”340 
 
332 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
333 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 418–31 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
334 See id. at 429.  
335 See Surden, supra note 320, at 1617; Ohm, supra note 131, at 59. 
336 Surden, supra note 320, at 1614. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. 
339 Once a particular constraint mechanism is successfully “employed”—such 
as a structural privacy constraint—policymakers may be unaware or indifferent 
to the details of the regulatory mechanism as long as it reasonably constrains 
unwanted behavior. See id. “In other words, as long as some mechanism is 
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Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones serves as a helpful 
example of the Court’s recognition of the swift disappearance of a 
structural privacy right—the right to be free of comprehensive, 
long term location tracking.341 The Court explicitly noted that 
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and 
others would not—and indeed simply could not—secretly monitor 
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a 
very long period.”342 
4. Cost Centric Approach to Eroding Privacy Rights 
In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito adopts a cost-centric 
approach to the disappearance of the structural right at issue.343 
First, he discusses the financial constraints that rendered 
“traditional surveillance for any extended period of time [] 
difficult[,] costly, and [] rarely undertaken.”344 Alito explains that 
comprehensively monitoring an individual over an extended period 
of time, “would have required a large team of agents, multiple 
vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” a costly undertaking that 
would have only been justified for an unusually important 
investigation.345 Alito jokes that such comprehensive monitoring 
would not have been impossible in the Framer’s era absent “a very 
tiny constable  . . .  with incredible fortitude and patience” to hide 
for twenty-eight days.346 After noting that devices like GPS 
surveillance “make long-term monitoring relatively easy and 
cheap,”347 removing the structural constraint on comprehensive, 
long-term monitoring, Alito recognizes the need for a legal 
constraint to restore constitutional balance. Thus, Alito maintains 
 
acceptably constraining unwanted behavior, the underlying issue and the choice 
of mechanism will garner little [legal] attention.” Id. 
340 Id. at 1618.  
341 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
342 Id. 
343 See id. at 429.  
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 Id. at 420 n.3. 
347 Id. at 430. After Jones, Bankston & Soltani determined that GPS 
surveillance costs twenty-eight times less than tracking an individual via covert 
car pursuit, and tracking via CSL costs half as much as GPS surveillance. See 
Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 350. 
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that even if the government had not physically trespassed on the 
defendant’s car, Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy over 
the totality of his movements; based on a long-held expectation 
that law enforcement would not, and could not, access such 
information.348 Here, Alito has recognized a rights-shift disrupting 
the Fourth Amendment equilibrium, caused by the advent of 
GPS.349 Under the framework proposed by this Note, Alito 
implicitly deemed GPS technology “exceptional.” 
Bankston & Soltani add a quantitative metric to lend rigor to 
Alito’s “structural rights-shift” theory of GPS technology, at issue 
in Jones.350 To do so, they conducted an empirical study, assessing 
the relative expense to law enforcement of employing: foot pursuit, 
covert pursuit, single car pursuit, five car pursuit, beeper 
technology, cell-phone tracking using a sting ray, GPS tracking, 
and tracking via CSLI.351 After comparing the relative costs of 
these techniques, they assert a general rule of thumb: if a new 
technology makes it “much less expensive” to collect information 
about individuals, a rights-shift has occurred.352 This paradigm 
proposes a cost-centric approach to determining technological 
exceptionalism.353 If a technology makes surveillance “much less 
expensive;” a rights-shift will ensue; tipping the Fourth 
Amendment balance in favor of law enforcement; which, under the 
definition proposed by this Note, renders the technology 
exceptional.354 
To continue, Ryan Calo and Paul Ohm propose that if a 
technology is exceptional, it should receive a “fresh default 
analysis” or “standalone.”355 Since many new technological 
advances cause a rights-shift, throwing off the balance of power 
struck by the Fourth Amendment, this Note argues that courts will 
be wary to employ a fresh-default analysis each time an 
 
348 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
349 See Surden, supra note 320, at 1626. 
350 Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 337. 
351 See id at 342. 
352 Id. at 337. 
353 See id. 
354 Id.; Ohm, supra note 131. 
355 Ohm, supra note 131, at 47; see Calo, supra note 302, at 551. 
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exceptional technology is at issue. Instead, this Note endorses a 
holistic analysis of the technology and its implications, geared 
toward the class of information sought. This approach does not 
automatically reject well-settled Fourth Amendment doctrine, but 
allows for a departure from categorical rules in certain 
circumstances. The following sub-part discusses this holistic 
analysis, labeled by Professor Luke Milligan as “poly-analogical” 
reasoning. 
B. Rejecting Conventional Analogies When an Exceptional 
Technology Is at Issue 
Analogical reasoning is often thought to be at the core of legal 
reasoning, and thus, judicial decision making.356 An “analogy” is 
defined as “the inference that two or more things that are similar to 
each other in some respects are also similar in other respects.”357 
1. Mono-Analogical Reasoning 
The prevailing approach courts use to analogize a novel fact 
pattern to a pre-existing one is described by Professor Milligan as 
mono-analogical.358 The term mono-analogical describes a type of 
analogical reasoning where only one dimension of a tool or 
technology is assessed.359 When technology is analyzed, most 
often, the technology’s function is assessed by comparing it to the 
function of a previous technology.360 Mono-analogical reasoning 
typically works in “four simple steps:” 
(1) Fact pattern A has a certain characteristic, X; (2) Fact 
pattern B differs from A in some respects, but shares characteristic, 
X; (3) the law treats characteristic X in a certain way; (4) because 
B shares a characteristic (X) with A, the law should treat B the 
same way it treats A.361 
 
356 See Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, in 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016); 
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 
504 (1948). 
357 Analogy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1995). 
358 Milligan, supra note 275, at 1319–20. 
359 Id. at 1323–24. 
360 See id. at 1322. 
361 Id. at 1321–22.  
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Mono-analogical reasoning can be very useful when used to 
liken two non-exceptional items, regardless of any facial 
similarities between them.362 For example, the facts of the famous 
tort case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., in which a car 
manufacturer was held liable for damages suffered by a third-party, 
can be analogized to a situation where a plaintiff finds a dead snail 
at the bottom of her soft drink; based on only one element of each 
factual scenario.363 A soda bottle and a car are quite different. 
However, the legal nexus between the two—the fact that negligent 
production of either can be expected to produce “danger”—is 
strong enough to determine that both scenarios allow a plaintiff to 
directly sue a manufacturer.364 Here, the Court only needed to 
focus on one dimension of each fact pattern to reach its conclusion: 
if a soda bottle or a car are negligently manufactured, injury to a 
third-party, not in contract with the manufacturer, may result.365 
The mono-analogical reasoning employed here may look as 
follows: 
(1) A negligently manufactured vehicle can be 
expected to produce “danger” to its user; (2) A 
negligently produced soda bottle (for example, one 
with a snail inside) may also produce danger to its 
user; (3) the law will hold a manufacturer liable to 
an injured user if a vehicle malfunctions due to its 
manufacturer’s negligence; (4) because a user may 
be injured by a snail negligently allowed in a soda 
bottle, the law will hold the manufacturer liable if 
the user is injured.366 
 
362 Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Analogy, Expertise, and 
Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 262 (2017). 
363 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916); 
Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 562. 
364 See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 362, at 263–64. 
365 Id. 
366 Cf. id. (this type of mono-analogical reasoning looks only at the product’s 
propensity, if negligently manufactured, to cause injury to a user not in contract 
with the product’s manufacturer. Thus, although there are many facial 
differences between a tortuously manufactured car and soda bottle, courts often 
reach conclusions based a single similarity between otherwise dissimilar cases.)  
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In this instance, the dimensions that differentiate a car and soda 
bottle manufacturer, such as the tools used for manufacturing, 
customers reached, efficiency of the operation, and so on, do not 
affect the relevant legal analysis. The Court reached its 
conclusions, focusing on just one aspect of the manufacturers: does 
their product, if produced negligently, have the potential to cause 
danger to a user?367 
By contrast, mono-analogical reasoning is under-inclusive 
when an exceptional technology is analyzed to a non-exceptional 
one. A famous example of the Court attempting to draw such an 
analogy occurred in Olmstead v. United States.368 In Olmstead, 
FBI agents installed wiretaps in the basement of the defendant’s 
office building and in the streets near his home due to suspicion 
that he was illegally transporting liquor.369 The Court addressed 
whether the wiretaps constituted a warrantless “search” of the 
defendant’s conversations, despite the lack of government trespass. 
Finding that no search occurred, the Court analyzed as follows: 
(1) Numerous cases before the Court involved fact 
patterns without physical trespass; (2) the Court had 
never found a Fourth Amendment search without 
physical trespass; (3) the FBI’s use of a wiretap did 
not involve physical trespass; (4) the use of a 
wiretap does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search.370 
Olmstead, which was overturned by United States v. Katz in 
1967, is a prime example of the Court’s failure to recognize the 
exceptional nature of the wiretap in its ruling. Electronic 
eavesdropping, first employed by law enforcement in the 1890s, 
disrupted the balance of Fourth Amendment protection by allowing 
law enforcement access to information it was unable to previously 
retrieve without a warrant.371 However, it took the Supreme Court 
 
367 See id. 
368 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928). 
369 Id. at 457. 
370 See Milligan, supra note 275, at 1323. 
371 William Lee Adams, Brief History: Wiretapping, TIME (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2022653,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/6C4U-DRVX]; Michael Pollack, A Short History of 
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another seventy years to properly tighten Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny to account for this imbalance.372 
To continue, in cell-phone cases before 2014, only one 
dimension of a smart-phone—its functionality—was typically 
discussed.373 Since cell-phones disrupted the Fourth Amendment 
equilibrium, rendering them exceptional,374 engaging in an analysis 
solely focused on their function is gravely under-inclusive. 
Further, in the context of the Riley case, if the Court applied a 
mono-analogical approach, premised on the idea that a cell phone 
functions like an address book or other pre-digital tool, a 
warrantless search incident to arrest would be lawful.375 Moreover, 
in the context of the Carpenter case, if CSLI records functioned as 
business records, like the bank records at issue in Miller, their 
warrantless search would be lawful under the third-party 
doctrine.376 
2. Poly-Analogical Reasoning 
To combat the under-inclusiveness of mono-analogical 
reasoning, this Note proposes that courts employ a holistic, “poly-
analogical” approach. Such an approach invites courts to reflect on 
the practical implications of a new technology, beyond its mere 
function. A technology’s non-functional dimensions may include 
frequency of use, storage capacity, efficiency, and ability to 
 
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/nyregion/a-short-history-of-
wiretapping.html [https://perma.cc/PNW2-KMH5]. 
372 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead). 
373 See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507–08 (Cal. 2011), abrogated by Riley 
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (“[N]either defendant nor the dissent 
persuasively explains why the sheer quantity of personal information should 
be determinative. Even ‘small spatial container[s]’ that hold less information 
than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate and private information, 
such as photographs, letters, or diaries.”). 
374 See infra Part I.C. 
375 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014); cf. United States v. 
Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 236 (5th Cir. 2002) (analogizing the search of floppy 
disks and CDs to opening a closed container). See generally Milligan, supra 
note 275.  
376 See generally Milligan, supra note 275. 
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aggregate information.377 Justice Roberts, in Carpenter, delineated 
three non-functional factors to help guide a court assessing the role 
of an exceptional technology in pre-existing doctrine.378 These 
factors are aimed not at the technology’s function, but the nature of 
the information targeted.379 
The following sub-part will discuss the Court’s poly-analogical 
approach to smart-phone cases in Riley and Carpenter. Although 
Justice Roberts did not specifically address the three 
aforementioned factors until Carpenter, they were eluded to, and 
guided the Court’s reasoning, in Riley. 
3. Riley, Carpenter, and Poly-Analogical Analysis in Action 
Chief Justice Robert’s reasoning in Riley and Carpenter 
exemplify the Court’s response to technological exceptionalism, 
and its attempt to restore the Fourth Amendment to a state of 
equilibrium.380 To elaborate, the Court first identified the 
exceptional nature of the technology at issue by assessing its 
impact on the balance of power between police and individual 
privacy. Then it rejected conventional analogies in light of the 
technology’s exceptionalism, focusing on both the function of the 
smart-phone on its non-functional dimensions. Finally, it engaged 
in a holistic analysis to ascertain the propriety of applying the 
search incident to lawful arrest and third-party doctrines to a smart 
phone, and CSLI, respectively.381 
4. Riley Declines to Extend the Search Incident to Lawful 
Arrest Doctrine to a Smart Phone on Arrestee’s Person 
A poly-analogical approach was employed by Justice Robert’s 
in the majority opinion of Riley.382 In Riley, the government 
attempted to analogize searching an arrestee’s cell phone to 
 
377 Id. at 1320. 
378 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (emphasizing (1) 
“the deeply revealing nature” of the information retrieved, (2) the information’s 
“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach,” and (3) “the inescapable and 
automatic nature of its collection”). 
379 See id. 
380 See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206; Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473. 
381 See cases cited supra note 380. 
382 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485. 
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searching a carton of cigarettes, address book, wallet, or purse, 
incident to arrest.383 Roberts sternly rejected this argument, holding 
that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets does not 
substantially intrude on an arrestee’s privacy beyond the arrest 
itself when a physical item is searched, but, “any extension of that 
reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.”384 
Moreover, Roberts analyzed a cell phone’s non-functional 
dimensions, ultimately rejecting the government’s attempt to liken 
a smartphone to pre-digital items. 
First, a cell phone has immense storage capacity.385 A cell-
phone can store the equivalent of “millions of pages of text,” 
dating back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.386 Next, 
cell-phone data can be aggregated.387 A cell phone collects in one 
place many distinct types of information—“an address, a note, a 
prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more in 
combination than any isolated record.”388 Additionally, the Court 
discussed the pervasive nature of the smart phone.389 “Prior to the 
digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive 
personal information with them as they went about their day.”390 
However, as of 2013, nearly three quarters of smart phone users 
reported being within five feet of their phones most of the time, 
while 12% of users admitted to using their phones in the shower.391 
Justice Roberts sarcastically notes that “[cell phones] are now such 
a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
 
383 In Riley, the government argued that searching all the data on an arrestee’s 
cell phone was “materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items 
such as an address book, wallet, or purse. Justice Roberts, in response, reasoned 
that “[t]hat is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable 
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but 
little else justifies lumping them together.” Id. at 2488. 
384 Id. at 2489. 
385 Id.; see Milligan, supra note 275, at 1320. 
386 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
387 See id. 
388 Id. 
389 Id. at 2490. 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
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from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of 
human anatomy.”392 
The Riley Court expressly rejected both the government’s 
proposed mono-analogical approach,393 and the previously 
categorical rule of United States v. Robinson that a warrantless 
search incident to arrest is presumptively lawful.394 
5. Carpenter Declines to Extend the Third-Party Doctrine to 
CSLI Held by a Private Wireless Carrier 
Chief Justice Roberts, in his majority opinion, isolates three 
specific factors to help guide a court’s analysis of an exceptional 
technology.395 To begin, the Court explained that information that 
is “deeply revealing” of some private quality of the person under 
surveillance warrants protection.396 Quoting Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in Jones, the Court addressed how location 
information reveals more than someone’s movements, but through 
them, the individual’s “familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”397 This factor highlights the connection 
between the intimate nature of the data at issue, and a person’s 
Fourth Amendment right over that data.398 The Carpenter Court 
found that time stamped CSLI, similar to GPS information, 
provided an intimate window into a person’s life and was thus, 
 
392 Id. at 2484. 
393 “And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow law 
enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, even though 
people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical 
form. . . . [I]t is implausible that [a citizen] would have strolled around with 
video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets. 
But because, each of those items has a pre-digital analogue, [the government 
argues] police…would be able to search a phone for all those items—a 
significant diminution of privacy.” Id. at 2493. 
394 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 
395 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 2217. 
398 The connection between the intimacy of information and one’s expectation 
of privacy over the information is not new. Professor Orin Kerr’s “private facts” 
model of Fourth Amendment protection centers on the sensitivity and intimacy 
of the information obtained. Freiwald’s intrusiveness factor also determines the 
intimacy of the information revealed by the surveillance technique at issue. See 
Ohm, supra note 131, at 14. 
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“deeply revealing.”399 This factor, which is arguably the most 
important,400 considering the Court held that CSLI “hold[s] for 
many Americans the ‘privacies of life,’” cut in favor of finding a 
search had occurred.401 
The second factor highlights the Court’s willingness to protect 
information that possesses “depth, breadth, and comprehensive 
reach.”402 Professor Ohm breaks this requirement down into three 
discrete measures.403 “Depth” refers to the detail and precision of 
the information stored.404 “Breadth” refers to the frequency and 
length of data collection.405 Finally, “comprehension” refers to the 
number of people tracked by the database.406 
The Court found that CSLI possessed depth, breadth, and a 
comprehensive reach, emphasizing that CSLI contains “the whole 
of [a person’s] physical movements” and a “detailed chronicle of a 
person’s physical presence.”407 The depth factor, similar to the 
“deeply revealing” factor cut in favor of finding the Fourth 
Amendment was implicated, due CSLI’s precision.408 Since CSLI 
can place an individual inside a place of worship, a storefront, their 
home, and other revealing locations, the “depth” factor cuts toward 
the need for a warrant.409 
Additionally, CSLI is invasive due to its breadth.410 The 
database at issue in Carpenter stored “an average of 101 data 
points” daily, and, most wireless carriers store CSLI for five 
years.411 Roberts emphasizes this point in discussing how a person 
may be effectively “tailed,” far before law enforcement has any 
 
399 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2223. 
400 Ohm, supra note 131, at 13. 
401 See id. 
402 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
403 Ohm, supra note 131, at 14–15. 
404 Id. at 15. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. 
407 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20. 
408 See id. 
409 See id. 
410 See id. at 2223. 
411 Id. at 2209, 2218. 
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suspicion that they have committed a crime.412 He notes that 
“[w]hoever the suspect turns out to be, he has effectively been 
tailed every moment of every day for five years, and the police 
may—in the Government’s view—call upon the results of that 
surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.”413 
As for comprehensive reach, the Court determined that, since 
“location information is continually logged for all of the 400 
million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to 
persons who might happen to come under investigation—this 
newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”414 
Finally, the Carpenter majority looked to the “inescapable and 
automatic nature” of how the information is collected.415 This 
factor can also be split into two discrete inquiries.416 First, the 
Court looked to the whether the surveillance was “inescapable.”417 
The majority implicitly embraced petitioner’s argument that 
cellphones have become such a pervasive part of modern life that 
their use cannot be considered “voluntary,”—or put differently, 
“escapable.”418 Whether one needs to use the service at issue “to be 
a functioning member of modern society” speaks to one of the 
underlying theories of the third-party doctrine—the extent to which 
the target of collection voluntarily exposed such information to a 
private party.419 The majority in Carpenter determined this factor 
cut in favor of protection. Citing Riley, the Court held that cell 
phones are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that 
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern 
 
412 Id. at 2218. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
415 Id. at 2223. 
416 Ohm, supra note 131, at 19. 
417 See id. at 19–21. 
418 Brief for Petitioner, at 39–42, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402). 
419 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from 
the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data. As a 
result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of 
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”). 
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society.”420 Thus, a cellphone user cannot be said to voluntarily 
assume the risk of turning over their location data to a service 
provider in a meaningful way.421 
In contrast to inescapability, the automatic nature of a 
surveillance method corresponds to an individual’s ability to “opt-
out” of having their data collected.422 CSLI is automatic because 
location records are generated whenever an individual uses their 
phone, and there is no ability for the user to “opt-out” of having 
their location chronicled.423 
III. ASSESSING HASH-VALUE MATCHING AND THE PRIVATE AND 
BINARY SEARCH DOCTRINES AFTER CARPENTER 
“When confronting new concerns wrought by 
digital technology, this Court has been careful not 
to uncritically extend existing precedents.”424 
As discussed above, a technology is exceptional if it is 
qualitatively different from others in the same general category.425 
To determine technological exceptionalism, this Note asks 
 
420 Id. at 2210; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell phone—almost 
a “feature of human anatomy,”—tracks nearly exactly the movements of its 
owner. While individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry 
cell phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner 
beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, 
political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales. Id. at 2490 (noting 
that “nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of 
their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their 
phones in the shower.”). 
421 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
422 Ohm, supra note 131, at 20. 
423 Id. “[A] cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without 
any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. Virtually any 
activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails 
and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when 
checking for news, weather, or social media updates. Apart from disconnecting 
the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of 
location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily 
‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical 
movements.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
424 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222. 
425 See supra Part I.A. 
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whether, in relation to other surveillance techniques in the same 
category, hashing meaningfully disrupts the balance of power 
between law enforcement and individuals. 
Positing that hashing belongs to the general category of 
techniques that authenticate data in the binary, this Part first 
assesses whether hashing makes binary authentication of data 
“much less expensive” than other techniques of its kind—
specifically, canine sniffs and narcotics field tests. If this question 
is answered in the affirmative, this Note will conclude that hashing 
causes a rights-shift; which meaningfully disrupts the current 
balance of Fourth Amendment power. Moreover, if determined to 
be exceptional, this Note proposes that courts should decline to 
analogize hashing to pre-digital technologies, and instead employ a 
holistic analysis of hashing’s functional and non-functional 
attributes when assessing its fit within established doctrine. 
A. Surveillance Techniques that Reveal Information in the Binary 
Hash-value matching to detect contraband falls into the 
category of surveillance techniques that reveal only the presence 
(or absence) of contraband. This Section explores two commonly 
used binary authentication techniques. First, it assesses law 
enforcement’s use of canine sniffs, at issue in the Place line of 
cases.426 Second, it analyzes field tests for narcotics, at issue in 
Jacobsen and its progeny.427 
1. Canine Sniffs 
Canines are widely used “volatile organic compound”428 
detectors, often employed to detect the presence of narcotics and 
 
426 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see 
also supra Part I.C.4. 
427 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984). 
428 A compound is described as “volatile” if it evaporates easily, releasing 
molecules into the atmosphere. What Is a Volatile Organic Compound, ION SCI., 
https://www.ionscience.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/What-is-a-VOC-
TOFU-V1.0-UK.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTJ4-8JF8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
2019] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT & HASH-VALUE MATCHING 1309 
 
explosives.429 Many illicit substances, including amphetamines, 
cocaine, and heroin release compounds into the air that a properly 
trained canine can detect.430 Upon detecting the compound, the 
canine will alert their handler to where it smells the drug.431 
Canines are recognized as the most mobile, flexible, fast, and 
durable real-time detectors of narcotics and explosives.432 
However, canine sniffs are quite costly, for several reasons. 
First, they are fallible, leading to false positives. The detection of a 
false positive is costly because it requires further testing and 
subsequent litigation. The accuracy of a canine sniff is measured 
by both the proportion of correct “hits,” (when a canine detects the 
presence of a drug), and the proportion of “false alerts,” (when the 
canine incorrectly indicates the presence of a drug).433 A perfectly 
 
429 Tadeusz Jezierski et al., Information-Seeking Behaviour of Sniffer Dogs 
During Match-to-Sample Training in the Scent Lineup, 39 POLISH PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 71, 71 (2008). 
430 See generally Ed Grabianowski, How Police Dogs Work, 
HOWSTUFFWORKS (May 3, 2004), https://people.howstuffworks.com/police-
dog.htm [https://perma.cc/R54A-N9K3] (describing the process of training 
canines, whose sense of smell is almost fifty times as sensitive as a human’s, to 
ferret out various narcotics); cf. Tadeusz Jezierski et al., Efficacy of Drug 
Detection by Fully Trained Police Dogs Varies by Breed, Training Level, Type 
of Drug, and Search Environment, 237 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 112, 114 (2014) 
(comparing the relative ease with which trained dogs can detect marijuana, 
amphetamine, cocaine, and heroin).  Police dogs are typically trained by first 
being presented with a white, odorless towel. After the dog has played with the 
towel, and views it as a toy, its handler will wrap an illicit substance inside the 
towel. The dog will then begin to associate the smell of the substance with its 
toy. After this, the handler will hide the towel, with the substance, in various 
places. When the dog smells its toy—the substance—it will dig and scratch at 
the area to alert its handler that it has found its toy. Grabianowski, supra note 
431, at 4.  
431 Karl Smallwood, How Do They Train Drug Sniffing Dogs?, 
TODAYIFOUNDOUT (Jan. 19, 2018), 
http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2018/01/how-do-they-train-drug-
sniffing-dogs/ [https://perma.cc/73FJ-F9RD].  Once a dog has learned to 
successfully seek out a smell when commanded, the trainer conditions the dog to 
engage in an appropriate action to alert him to the smell. Id.  For example, some 
drug detecting dogs are trained to paw at the spot where the illegal substance is 
located. Id. 
432 See, e.g., Jezierski et al., supra note 430, at 112; Burkhard Bilger, Beware 
of the Dogs, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 2012) https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2012/02/27/beware-of-the-dogs [https://perma.cc/8UFX-CB4N]. 
433 Id. at 113.  
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accurate canine sniff would guarantee that no target material 
remains undetected, and no other materials than the target are 
falsely indicated by the canine.434 
A canine may not be able to detect contraband for a variety of 
reasons. First, canines are not always trained in similar enough 
circumstances to the ones they encounter in the real world.435 For 
example, a canine who can detect as little as a trillionth of a gram 
of a narcotic in a spare basement room, will likely not produce the 
same results in a crowd of people, a windy environment, or if the 
narcotic is moving with an individual.436 Moreover, a canine may 
not be able to get close enough to the target material to detect its 
presence—especially if the target is moving. Additionally, canines 
tire out.437 A canine that is overheated, or panting for another 
reason, has a less reliable nose.438 A 2013 study involving 1219 
canines showed that canines missed target material 5% of the time 
amphetamine was sought; 12.6% of the time cocaine was sought; 
and 12% of the time heroin was sought.439 
False alerts occur due to the aforementioned fallibilities of the 
canines, as well as errors by handlers, and the pervasive 
contamination of currency by cocaine.440 In rejecting evidence that 
a canine detected narcotics on a defendant, courts have noted that 
“a substantial portion of United States currency  . . .  is tainted with 
sufficient traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine 
 
434 See id. 
435 Alexandra Horowitz, The Limits of Detection, THE NEW YORKER, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-limits-of-detection 
[https://perma.cc/YGX3-HHGT] (Apr. 24, 2013).   
436 Id. 
437 See id. 
438 Id. 
439 Jezierski et al., supra note 430, at 114. The above results come from a 2013 
study conducted by the Institute of Genetics and Animal Breeding of Polish 
Academy Sciences, Department of Animal Behavior. The trial included 1219 
experimental searching tests; 440 were performed by German Shepherds, 517 by 
Labrador retrievers, 203 by Terriers, and 59 by Cocker Spaniels. On a single 
day, no more than two searching tests were conducted by any dog. If two 
searching tests were conducted on a specific day for one dog, the second test 
was done in a separate room. The dogs and their handlers waited in another 
building until they were asked to come in for their trial. Id. 
440 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411–12 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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to alert to their presence” and because as much of 80% of all 
currency in circulation contains drug residue, a dog alert is of 
“little value.”441 
Additionally, it is expensive for law enforcement to train and 
use canines. It costs law enforcement about $15,000 to train a team 
of fourteen canines.442 Purchasing a single trained canine will cost 
between $5,000 and $25,000.443 These metrics do not even 
consider the cost of paying the handler’s salary—who will often 
have to work early mornings and late nights to continuously train 
the canine.444 
2. Narcotics Colorimetric (Spot) Test 
Chemical field tests are an “illicit drug identification technique 
commonly used by law enforcement, border security personnel, 
and forensic laboratories” to detect the presence of narcotics.445 
Suspected illicit materials seized by police are often analyzed on 
the spot to determine if an illegal drug is present.446 Although the 
government uses a range of analytical techniques to determine the 
existence of narcotics, the most commonly used is a colorimetric 
(“spot”) test.447 During a spot test, an examiner adds a chemical 
 
441 United States v. $242,484.00, 351 F.3d 499, 511 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that because as much as 80% of all currency in circulation contains drug residue, 
a dog alert “is of little value”), vacated on other grounds by reh’g en banc, 357 
F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214–
17 (3d Cir. 1994) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[A] substantial portion of United States currency . . . is tainted with sufficient 
traces of controlled substances to cause a trained canine to alert to their 
presence.”); Caballes, 543 U.S. at 412. 
442 Michael Von Fremd, Intense Training for Bomb-Sniffing Dogs, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 12, 2012) https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=130545&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/3545-3ZCE]. 
443 How Do You Train a Dog to Sniff Bombs?, PRICEONOMICS (Dec. 31, 2015), 
https://priceonomics.com/how-do-you-train-a-dog-to-sniff-bombs/ 
[https://perma.cc/2YYA-M2NC]. 
444 Id. 
445 Morgan Philp & Shanlin Fu, A Review of Chemical ‘Spot’ Tests: A 
Presumptive Illicit Drug Identification Technique, 10 DRUG TESTING & 
ANALYSIS 95, 95 (2018). 
446 Id. 
447 Id. Further, pursuant to evidentiary authentication requirements, a positive 
spot test will be followed by laboratory testing using a more precise method, 
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reagent to a sample of the seized material and observes any 
changes in color. Specified color changes indicate the presence of 
a particular class of compounds—such as amphetamines.448 
A 2018 study by the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) 
indicated that the average total cost of performing a color spot test 
is $166.98 per sample tested.449 Moreover, the National Criminal 
Justice Reference Service is proposing the introduction of portable 
mass spectrometric instruments, which are more precise than the 
current spot tests, and would cut costs by ensuring only probative 
samples are re-tested in the laboratory.450 
However, despite the relatively low costs of narcotics spot 
tests, they have a high error rate, resulting in subsequent litigation 
and retesting costs.451 Additionally, more precise methods are far 
more expensive and timely to employ.452 Color tests are imperfect 
because of their inherently subjective nature.453 A police officer, 
with just hours of training from another officer who knows the 
 
such as chromatography or mass spectrometry. Prasant Potuluri, Drug 
Identification in Law Enforcement, EVIDENCE TECH. MAG., 
http://www.evidencemagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=1260&Itemid=49 [https://perma.cc/87EJ-PQM2] (last visited Jan. 31, 
2019). 
448 Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 96. 
449 Christopher C. Mulligan et al., Analytical Validation and Impact 
Assessment of On-Site Evidence Screening via Ambient Sampling, Portable 
Mass Spectometry, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 8 (2018), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251910.pdf [https://perma.cc/396J-
FN4E]. This metric includes the on-site, precinct, transportation, in-laboratory, 
and fixed costs of testing a single sample. Id. 
450 Id. at 9–10. 
451 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 412 (2005) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“[t]he infallible dog [] is a creature of legal fiction. . . . [T]heir 
supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing well-trained 
animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to 
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the 
pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine.) 
452 See id. at 56. The cost of a mass spectrometer, the most precise way to test 
for narcotics, can cost up to $1,000,000. Id. at 54 (graphing the relative costs of 
various analytical techniques to detect narcotics and determining color spot tests 
are the least costly method, but also the least accurate). 
453 See id. at 60. 
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technique, can perform a spot test and determine its result.454 
Further, these tests are only done when law enforcement believes 
the substance they are testing is illicit. Thus, the tests are always 
done in anticipation of criminal litigation—which makes their 
subjective nature more worrisome. In addition, although color tests 
can identify the most common drugs of abuse, there are limitations 
on what can be detected.455 Color tests can only identify previously 
characterized drugs, which creates an issue due to the growing 
number of new psychoactive substances (“NPS”).456 There are a 
significant number of NPS on the market, including Fentanyl and 
other synthetic opioid derivatives, that color testing cannot 
identify.457 
B. Hash-Value Matching is Exceptional 
Hash-value matching is qualitatively different from other types 
of binary authentication, such as canine sniffs and spot tests.458 
Other types of binary authentication methods are conducted after 
the government has an articulable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing.459 Alternatively, every internet communication is 
hashed, without any suspicion.460 Second, hashing is conducted by 
a private entity, at no cost to the government.461 Under Bankston 
and Soltani’s theory, it is thus much less costly than other methods 
of its kind.462 Therefore, the collection of hash-evidence causes a 
 
454 See id. There have been significantly more NPS on the market, shown by a 
statistic from the EU that a NPS was reported to their Early Warning System 
every week in 2016. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioid derivatives remain 
extremely dangerous public safety threats, particularly in the United States 
where 167 kilograms of illicit fentanyl was seized in 2015. Other seized 
substances include tryptamines, anesthetics, steroids, benzodiazepines, and 
hallucinogens. Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 95.  
455 Philp & Fu, supra note 445, at 95. 
456 Id. 
457 See id. 
458 See supra Part I.A. 
459 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1984); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983). 
460 See supra Part I.A. 
461 See supra Part I.A. 
462 See generally Bankston & Soltani, supra note 315, at 350–56. Compare id. 
with Parts III.A.1–III.A.2 (discussing how a colorimetric spot test costs 
approximately $166—without accounting for subsequent testing and litigation 
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rights-shift and erodes a structural right to be free from pervasive 
monitoring.463 This rights-shift tips the Fourth Amendment balance 
toward the government. Hashing is thus an exceptional technology 
which “supports a break with judicial precedent.”464 
1. Hashing is Non-Targeted 
The fundamental difference between hashing and other binary 
authentication methods is that hashing is automatic, non-targeted, 
and cannot be avoided by any internet user.465 Further, hashing 
occurs before the government has any reason to believe criminal 
activity is afoot. Every image transmitted via an ECSP is hashed 
without an individualized suspicion of its sender or recipient. This 
renders hashing unlike, and significantly more invasive, than other 
techniques of its kind. 
By contrast, individual property is only subject to canine sniffs 
or spot tests—other forms of binary authentication—after the 
government has an articulable suspicion that a specific person has 
committed a crime. In fact, the Place majority, in articulating that 
probable cause was not required for a canine sniff, concluded that 
“the principles of Terry and its progeny” allowed the officer to 
briefly detain luggage to expose it to a canine sniff, “to investigate 
the circumstances that aroused his suspicion.”466 Similarly, the 
Jacobsen Court predicated its acceptance of a warrantless spot test 
for cocaine on the fact that the agent already had a reasonable 
suspicion for the test, and that there was a high probability that the 
suspect possessed contraband.467 Thus, warrantless canine sniffs 
and spot tests are legally justified because they are discerning, 
targeted, and typically do not effect individuals unless they are 
suspected of a crime.468 Canine sniffs are employed in response to 
 
fees associated with mistakes and how a trained canine costs between $5,000–
$25,000). 
463 See Surden, supra note 320, at 1618. 
464 Ohm, supra note 131, at 39. 
465 See supra Part I.A. 
466 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (emphasis added). 
467 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (“The field test at issue 
could disclose only one fact previously unknown to the agent—whether or not a 
suspicious white powder was cocaine.” (emphasis added)).  
468 See generally, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109; Place, 462 U.S. 696.  
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a specific threat, or in certain locations, such as borders or 
airports.469 Thus, if an individual wants to avoid a narcotics-
sniffing dog, they could plausibly do so. Spot tests are used after a 
suspect has been identified, a substance has been seized from them, 
and the government suspects that substance is contraband. Like 
canine sniffs, spot tests are neither common nor pervasive. 
2. Hashing is Less Costly Than Other Binary Authentication 
Methods 
Private ECSPs install hash-value matching software on their 
own volition.470 Thus, the government does not spend any money 
to participate in an evidence gathering dynamic with ECSPs.471 
Since the PROTECT Act requires ECSPs with actual knowledge of 
child abuse images to disclose these contraband images to law 
enforcement, matching hash-values are reported directly to the 
government.472 Moreover, other types of consumer data are readily 
available for government acquisition via a § 2703(d) subpoena. 
The statutory framework regulating the collection and sharing of 
consumer data is porous, allowing the government to routinely 
obtain related consumer data, at no cost, and without an onerous 
showing of suspicion.473 
Finally, hash-value matching’s error rate is practically zero.474 
Therefore, the cost of subsequent litigation due to false hits is non-
existent.475 In sum, hashing software allows law enforcement a 
cost-free route to “sniff-out” digital contraband sent by any 
 
469 See Jerierski et al., supra note 435, at 112.  
470 Id.; United States v. Miller, No. 16-47-DLB-CJS, 2017 WL 2705963, at *1 
(E.D. Ky. June 23, 2017) (Google has been using its proprietary hashing 
software since 2008, specifically to assist in the interception of online child 
abuse images). 
471 See supra Part I.A. 
472 See supra Part I.A.2. 
473 See supra Part I.A.3. Both doctrines rely on the idea that “[a] private search 
extinguishes an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the object 
searched.” See e.g., Adams, supra note 186, at 1–2. In both circumstances, 
courts have held that once frustration of an individual’s expectation of privacy 
occurs by a private actor, the Fourth Amendments does not prohibit 
governmental use of the now “non-private information.” Id. at 2.  
474 See supra Part I.A. 
475 See supra Part I.A. 
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individual over the internet, without a particularized suspicion of 
wrongdoing. Additionally, courts have not scrutinized hashing due 
to its binary nature—despite the fact it allows for pervasive 
monitoring that was unthinkable at the time Place was decided.476 
Thus, hashing software has caused a rights-shift, eroding the 
structural privacy right to be free from pervasive government 
monitoring. This rights-shift has tilted the Fourth Amendment 
balance toward law enforcement. Under the framework proposed 
by this Note, hashing is therefore an “exceptional” technology. 
C. How Will Hashing Be Treated by the Post-Carpenter 
Framework? 
1. A Fourth Amendment Inquiry will not be Foreclosed Due 
to Hashing’s Binary Nature 
The binary search doctrine focuses on the surveillance 
technique used by law enforcement, as opposed to the information 
targeted.477 Thus, applying the binary search doctrine to an 
exceptional technique runs afoul of Carpenter’s test, which 
specifically addresses the class of information collected.478 
Moreover, Carpenter implicitly addressed a frightening possibility 
of the binary search doctrine: the more tailored an investigative 
technique is to detecting contraband, the less the public can 
reasonably expect the law to protect them against government 
intrusions.479 This possibility is why the Carpenter court chose to 
aim its analysis at the class of information collected.480 Since 
surveillance techniques are becoming even more tailored and 
efficient, the Court attempted to adjust the resulting Fourth 
Amendment imbalance by departing from an analysis aimed at the 
techniques; and instead addressing the information they seek. 
 
476 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he canine sniff is sui 
generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both 
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of 
the information revealed by the procedure.”). 
477 See id. 
478 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018). 
479 See id. at 2219. 
480 See id. at 2216–17. 
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2. A Fourth Amendment Analysis will not be Automatically 
Foreclosed by an ECSP’s Private Search 
Carpenter’s treatment of the third-party doctrine will guide the 
Court’s treatment of the private search doctrine, a subset of the 
former. Since hashing is “exceptional,” courts should decline to 
analogize it to pre-digital technologies, such as dog sniffs or spot 
tests, when assessing whether the private search doctrine 
forecloses a constitutional inquiry into the government’s actions. 
The Carpenter majority endorsed a “poly-analogical” approach to 
exceptional technologies in lieu of a traditional, REP analysis. 
Therefore, although an ECSP “searches” user data before law 
enforcement, in the same way that a wireless carrier views CSLI-
evidence before law enforcement, the private intermediary will not 
necessarily foreclose an inquiry into the constitutionality of law 
enforcement’s warrantless search of hash evidence. 
3. The Court Will Apply the Carpenter Factors to the Class of 
Information Sought 
Moreover, due to the parallel reasoning underlying the private 
search and third-party doctrines; the applicability of the private 
search doctrine to hashing can be neatly analyzed via the three 
factors posed in Carpenter.481 As a preliminary matter, under 
Carpenter, the Court will tailor these inquiries toward the type of 
information sought by the technology at issue. With hash-value 
matching, the information sought is contraband images contained 
within digital communications. 
Like other binary authentication methods, the class of 
information sought in hashing cases traditionally prompts a 
reviewing court to adopt an innocence theory of Fourth 
Amendment rights. Since hashing, by its nature, only reveals 
contraband, it is tempting for a court to foreclose any further 
inquiry into its constitutionality and deem such a method outside 
the amendment’s scope. But, investigative techniques are only 
becoming more tailored. We are heading toward a technological 
era where Loewy’s divining rod will exist, and law enforcement 
 
481 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; supra Part I.C.1.  
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will be able to scan the physical world for evidence of 
wrongdoing—drawing out only the guilty. 
The Orwellian future made possible by technological 
innovation underscores this Note’s proposal to apply a formalist 
approach to binary authentication cases. That is not to say that 
most binary authentication methods will violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Likely, these methods will not constitute a search. 
However, foreclosing an analysis based the technique’s ability to 
target only the guilty creates a slippery slope, and could lead to 
future governmental abuse. 
Next, courts should recognize hashing’s “exceptional” nature 
when deciding to apply a formalist approach to hashing cases. In 
earlier binary authentication cases, a presumption of 
constitutionality in binary search cases was more reasonable 
because the government already possessed some amount of 
individualized suspicion before performing the secondary privacy 
invasion. By contrast, images are routinely hashed without any 
suspicion at all. Thus, a reviewing court should note hashing’s 
exceptional nature when applying the Carpenter factors. 
First, contraband contained within digital communications is 
“deeply revealing” under Justice Robert’s test. Even a single image 
attached to an email may be of a deeply intimate nature. As 
discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Warshak, “[s]ince the advent of 
email . . . [p]eople are now able to send sensitive and intimate 
information instantaneously. . . . [L]overs exchange sweet nothings 
and businessmen swap ambitions plans, all with the click of a 
mouse. . . .”482 The Warshak Court describes an email account as 
“an account of its owner’s life,” access to which would give 
government agents the ability to peer deeply into one’s most 
intimate secrets. Thus, the deeply revealing information factor cuts 
in favor of a warrant requirement. 
Since the deeply revealing factor highlights the connection 
between the intimate nature of the data at issue and a Fourth 
Amendment right over that data, it is helpful to look at the 
recognized right protecting the content of email communications. 
 
482 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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Before the early 2000s, individuals enjoyed a structural right to be 
free from comprehensive monitoring of their emails contents—
which society reasonably expects the government will not engage 
in. As technology advanced, and such monitoring became possible, 
circuit courts intervened and expressly held that individuals had 
Fourth Amendment rights over their email content. Hashing’s 
disclosure of an image that precisely matches an image sent by a 
user, reveals part of the email’s content to the government. Thus, 
the deeply revealing nature factor cuts in favor of hashing 
constituting a search. 
The second factor highlights the Court’s willingness to protect 
information that possesses “depth, breadth, and comprehensive 
reach.”483 First, Robert’s depth factor is inapplicable to hashing 
and does not cut in either direction. The Carpenter court referred 
to depth to indicate the precision of an amalgamation of metadata. 
By contrast, hashing reveals content data. Hashing is perfectly 
“precise”—but not in the sense discussed by Justice Roberts. 
Moreover, hashing likely does not fulfill the “breadth” factor. 
Hashing, unlike digital location tracking, does not “store” 
information on its users. Hashing software either indicates that a 
user uploaded a matching, contraband, image, and further reviews 
that image; or fails to find a match and allows the image to 
metaphorically “flow” past the ISP’s bottleneck, to its intended 
recipient. As for “comprehensive reach,” although every 
communication flowing through an ISP is hashed, an ISP does not 
use hashing software to track its users the way that wireless 
carriers do via CSLI. Again, because hashing does not “store” 
information on its users, its reach should not be considered 
“comprehensive” in the Carpenter sense. Thus, the second factor 
cuts against finding a search. 
Finally, the Carpenter majority looked to the “inescapable and 
automatic nature” of how the information is collected.484 
Compliance with hashing software is an inescapable caveat of 
using an ECSP, including having an email account. Email is 
undoubtedly an indispensable part of the information age. Over the 
 
483 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
484 Id. 
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last decade, email has become “so pervasive that some persons 
may consider [it] to be [an] essential means or necessary 
instrument[] for self-expression, even self-identification.”485 
Further, hashing is automatic and indiscriminate. One cannot “opt-
out” of having their correspondences hashed if they choose to use 
email services. For these reasons, the “inescapable and automatic 
nature” factor cuts toward a warrant requirement for hash 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this Note uses hash-value matching to exemplify 
how information shared with an ECSP will be treated by the 
Fourth Amendment in the digital age. It poses a new framework 
for treating novel technologies and adopts an “equilibrium 
adjustment” approach to the Fourth Amendment.486 This 
framework first asks whether the technology is “exceptional,” 
meaning it disrupts the current balance of power struck by the 
Fourth Amendment.487 It proposes looking at whether the 
technology causes a “rights-shift” to determine if the Fourth 
Amendment balance has been disrupted; rendering a technology 
exceptional.488 Moreover, it adopts Bankston and Soltani’s cost 
centered approach to determining if a rights-shift occurred—which 
looks at how much less a new technology costs compared to others 
of its kind.489 
This Note proposes that exceptional technologies should not be 
analogized to their conventional predecessors.490 It analyzes and 
recommends the Carpenter Court’s “poly-analogical,” holistic 
approach to exceptional technologies.491 Finally, this Note assesses 
whether hashing is an exceptional technology, and how the Courts 
will treat warrantless hash-value matching after Carpenter.492 
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